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ABSTRACT—This Article identifies and analyzes a transsubstantive tool of
constitutional doctrine that to date has escaped scholarly attention. The
Article terms this device the “institution matching” canon. It can be stated
briefly as follows: When the government makes a decision that may
impinge upon a liberty or equality interest—which may or may not be
directly judicially enforced otherwise—a court should determine whether
the component of government that made the decision has actual competence
in and responsibility for the policy justifications invoked to curtail the
interest. If not, the court should reject the government action but leave open
the possibility of a “do-over” by a more appropriate component of
government. First identified in an early written opinion of Justice John Paul
Stevens, the institution matching canon continues to play an important if
imperfectly articulated role in criminal law, administrative law, and national
security doctrine. This Article provides a systematic survey of the ways that
the Court has employed institution matching and develops a taxonomy of
the canon’s costs and benefits.
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INTRODUCTION
A central problem in American constitutionalism is the translation of
abstract textual precommitments into stable and predictable doctrine—the
“set of rules and methods . . . used to decide a particular class of cases.”1
Analyzing constitutional doctrine, scholars use two distinct lenses. Some
limit their attention to a specific provision in the Constitution, such as the
Commerce Clause2 or the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause,3 and
explore optimal doctrinal specifications of that rule. Others employ a wider,
transsubstantive lens to isolate devices found across different areas of the

1

McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1639 (1995). This is a point of agreement among scholars of very different
normative commitments. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 877, 904 (1996) (“What matters to most constitutional debates, in and out of court, is the
doctrine the courts have created, not the text.”); see also Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1140 (1994) (making a case for the centrality of doctrine).
2
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15–20 (2010) (developing doctrinal
framework from first principles); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce
Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1393–99 (1987) (deriving an alternative Commerce Clause framework
from constitutional text and structure).
3
See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First
Amendment Analysis, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 416 (1996) (seeking to explain “a wide range of First
Amendment rules”); see also Frederick Schauer, The Aim and the Target in Free Speech Methodology,
83 NW. U. L. REV. 562, 564–65 (1989).
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law, such as the “strict scrutiny” test4 or the “clear statement” rule.5 Both
kinds of inquiry assess the decision rules courts use to implement the
Constitution. Does the work product of the Supreme Court, they ask, work
to promote the Constitution’s goals?6
This Article, working in the second vein of scholarship, identifies and
analyzes a transsubstantive tool of constitutional law that to date has
escaped scholarly attention. I label this device the “institution matching”
canon. The institution matching canon can be stated briefly as follows:
When the government makes a decision that may impinge upon a liberty or
equality interest—which may or may not be directly judicially enforced
otherwise—a court should determine whether the component of
government that made the decision has actual competence in or
responsibility for the policy justifications invoked to curtail the interest.
Only if the relevant institution is in fact tasked with furthering the relevant
policy goals, or if it can demonstrate that it has in fact applied expertise,
should the court allow the liberty or equality interest to be narrowed.
Otherwise, the court should reject the governmental action. In doing so,
however, the court shall not imply or assert that the government cannot
achieve the same policy goal through the use of a different component of
government. Rather, the court shall leave it up to the government to decide
whether to seek a “do-over” with a different governance instrument.
The institution matching canon emerges in the early jurisprudence of
Justice John Paul Stevens. It is one of his many important contributions to
U.S. public law across five years on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit and thirty-four years on the U.S. Supreme Court. Notably, it
emerged in Justice Stevens’s very first decisions as a Justice. It is evidence
that, from his early days on the Court, Justice Stevens had a particularly
clear grasp on the nettlesome problem of giving operational force to the
lofty, often opaque commitments of the Constitution. Unlike other Justices,
Justice Stevens has never confused the Constitution’s terrain with the
doctrinal map that the Court must develop in common law fashion to guide
other judges and governmental actors.
The standard narrative in the scholarship about Justice Stevens’s early
efforts is one of missed opportunity.7 It suggests that Justice Stevens’s
4

See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 798–801 (2006); see also Aziz Z. Huq,
Protecting Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16 (2012),
http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/112/16_Huq.pdf (exploring the use of strict
scrutiny in the Roberts Court).
5
See, e.g., John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399,
406–17 (2010).
6
Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 51 (2004)
(distinguishing “constitutional decision rules” from “constitutional operative propositions”).
7
See infra Part II.B (collecting early critical commentary on Justice Stevens’s jurisprudence
employing the institution matching canon).
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institution matching canon was never picked up by other Justices and
instead proved a “legal Lohengrin,” lost in the case reporters.8 The standard
account is wrong. Institution matching is not lost to the law. To the
contrary, the canon plays a significant role ranging across domains of
public law from administrative law to criminal law to national security law.
Despite its portability across scholarly bailiwicks—or perhaps because of
it—the institution matching canon has been largely ignored.9 Scholars have
missed important commonalities between lines of cases. Opportunities for
the canon’s extension are ignored. The canon’s potential costs accrue
without attracting attention. And the subtly but importantly distinct ways in
which different judges operationalize institution matching have gone
without comparative study.
This Article aims to fill a gap in the literature by providing a
comprehensive descriptive account of the institution matching canon. It also
provides a detailed analysis of the canon’s formulations, its strengths, and
its weaknesses. One of my purposes here is to illuminate familiar precedent
from a new perspective, identifying commonalities that have gone
unnoticed to date. My evaluative aim is more modest. I do not claim to
furnish a final reckoning of institution matching. Rather, I hope to situate
institution matching among the more familiar elements of the Court’s
doctrinal toolkit, and to specify both its different forms and its potential
advantages and costs. In the final analysis, a normative judgment about the
canon turns on larger, and more disputed, questions about how vigorous
courts should be in enforcing the Constitution. Skeptics of judicial authority
are unlikely to be enamored of the institution matching canon. Those more
comfortable with the concept of judicial review, by contrast, may discern an
appropriately defined and delimited space for the canon in the judicial
toolkit. My aim here is not to settle these larger disputes about the role of
the federal courts in constitutional enforcement. Rather, I aim here to isolate
one possible tool for judges in sufficient detail that readers with different
normative priors about judicial review can reach their own conclusions
about institution matching.
8

IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
One important exception is the work of Professor Dan Coenen. Professor Coenen identifies what
he calls a set of “constitutional ‘who’ rules” that “steer policy choices away from one decisionmaker to
another, on account of institutional capacities with regard to particular constitutional choices.” Dan T.
Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1370 (2002) [hereinafter Coenen, Rehnquist Court]; see also Dan T. Coenen,
The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible “Semisubstantive” Constitutional Rules, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2835, 2851–52 (2009) [hereinafter Coenen, Pros and Cons] (developing the argument that rules
can turn on institutional identity); cf. Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 2781, 2793 (2003) (identifying what is called here institution matching as a kind of “weak-form”
judicial review). Professor Coenen’s goal is to identify and defend a class of doctrinal measures used to
promote constitutional entitlements indirectly. He therefore aims to demonstrate the commonalities of
several diverse doctrinal tools rather than exploring the genealogy and consequences of one particular
implement. This Article takes up the latter task as to institution matching.
9
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The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I explores the modern origins of
the institution matching canon. I focus on the first occasion the canon was
applied, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong.10
To make clear Hampton’s contribution from the beginning, I distinguish its
institution matching logic from some close doctrinal cousins, such as the
avoidance canon and the clear statement rule. Part II turns to Hampton’s
post-history, and rehearses the standard account of its legacy as Supreme
Court precedent, which is largely pessimistic. Part III then challenges that
standard story by identifying three recent lines of cases in which the
institution matching canon is alive and well (albeit laboring incognito) in
the fields of criminal law, administrative law, and national security law. In
each line of cases, the Court has deployed institution matching as a way of
determining whether claimed policy justifications for narrowing a liberty or
equality interest “fit” or “match” in the case at hand. In each case, the
identity of the decisionmaker is employed as a proxy for the robustness of
the government’s reasons. Part IV turns from description to evaluation. It
asks whether the institution matching canon is likely to achieve its putative
goals and, if so, at what cost. That evaluation employs two perspectives: a
static analysis of discrete uses of institution matching, and a dynamic
analysis of how institution matching fits into a broader landscape of
political institutions interacting in predictable and sequential ways. I
conclude that the attractiveness of institution matching depends on one’s
priors about judicial review, but tentatively suggest some reasons to think it
will continue to play some substantial role in the Court’s doctrinal toolkit
given its superiority in some instances to other currently employed doctrinal
devices.
I.

THE DOCTRINAL ORIGINS OF INSTITUTION MATCHING

A. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong
On June 1, 1976, Justice John Paul Stevens handed down his first
opinions, a pair, for the U.S. Supreme Court. Both addressed claims by
aliens that their exclusion from a federal program violated the equality
component of the Fifth Amendment.11 In one case, the Court upheld the

10

426 U.S. 88 (1976). It is arguable that the idea of institution matching can be linked to the
institutional focus of the so-called “Princeton school” of constitutional theory. For an introduction to
that approach, see generally the essays collected in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS (Sotirios A. Barber &
Robert P. George eds., 2001). I am grateful to Professor Troy McKenzie for stressing this connection to
me.
11
Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (finding an equality rule in the Fifth
Amendment).

421

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

government’s facially discriminatory action; in the other it invalidated it.
The difference in outcomes turned on the institution matching canon.12
The first case, Matthews v. Diaz, concerned the eligibility rules for the
Medicare Part B supplemental medical insurance program.13 A three-judge
District Court had invalidated on equal protection grounds the program’s
categorical exclusion of aliens who were not lawful permanent residents
and who had lived in the United States less than five years.14 A unanimous
Supreme Court, with Justice Stevens writing, reversed. Justice Stevens
began by emphasizing the “heterogen[eity]” of the domestic alien
population, which had “a wide-ranging variety of ties” to the United
States.15 Congress, explained Justice Stevens, could reasonably respond to
such variation by awarding benefits to some, but not all, aliens.16 Moreover,
the Court explained, the “political” nature of immigration policy made it
peculiarly unfit for judicial resolution and “more appropriate to either the
Legislature or the Executive.”17
In the second case decided that day, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, the
Court invalidated a rule of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) barring all
persons except American citizens and natives of Samoa from federal
employment.18 The CSC rule was challenged by five Chinese nationals,
including a janitor, a file clerk, an evaluator of educational programs, and a
postal worker.19 Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Stevens
invalidated the CSC rule.20 Justice Stevens might have developed the
heterogeneity point of Matthews to conclude that the categorical nature of
the CSC rule rendered it indiscriminately overbroad. (Indeed, the Court of
Appeals rested its judgment in favor of the alien plaintiffs on that logic.)21
But Stevens instead pursued what he termed a “narrower inquiry” into the
manner in which the alienage exclusion had been adopted22—a logic that
did not entail a decision on the bare ground of constitutional text.

12

See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National
Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 277–78 (explaining context of cases).
13
426 U.S. 67, 70 & n.1 (1976).
14
Id. at 73–74.
15
Id. at 78–79.
16
Id. at 80.
17
Id. at 81.
18
426 U.S. 88, 90 & n.1 (1976) (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976) and explaining that it had been
construed to permit the employment of American Samoans).
19
Id. at 91.
20
Id. at 116–17. Is the Hampton opinion based on due process grounds or equal protection
concerns? In dissent, Justice Rehnquist complained that the Court was not clear but “inexplicably melds
together the concepts of equal protection and procedural and substantive due process.” Id. at 119
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
21
Id. at 96 (majority opinion).
22
Id. at 103.
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To begin, Justice Stevens rejected as too “extreme” Matthews’s
broadest reading—that the “federal power over aliens is so plenary that any
agent of the National Government may arbitrarily subject all resident aliens
to different substantive rules from those applied to citizens.”23 Nor, Justice
Stevens said, had Congress unequivocally barred the CSC from adopting
the categorical alienage bar.24 Instead, he found infirmity in the reasons the
CSC supplied for aliens’ exclusion, and more specifically in the mismatch
between those reasons and the CSC’s mandate.25 Government lawyers had
invoked foreign affairs and security justifications for the exclusion. But,
Stevens explained, the CSC’s “normal responsibilities” did not extend to
such matters26:
When the Federal Government asserts an overriding national interest as
justification for a discriminatory rule which would violate the Equal Protection
Clause if adopted by a State, due process requires that there be a legitimate
basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest. If
the agency which promulgates the rule has direct responsibility for fostering or
protecting that interest, it may reasonably be presumed that the asserted
interest was the actual predicate for the rule. . . .
The difficulty with [the Government’s arguments] is that they do not
identify any interest which can reasonably be assumed to have influenced the
[CSC and other defendants] in the administration of their respective
responsibilities . . . .27

Hampton explicitly left unanswered whether Congress or the President
acting alone could adopt an exclusion based in some fashion on alienage.
Hinting that the answer might be “no,” Stevens drew the “fair” inference
that both Congress and the President had already “acquiesced” to the
alienage rule, which had been in effect since 1883, but cautioned that such

23

Id. at 101. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent endorsed this argument. Id. at 121–22 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
24
Id. at 109–10 (majority opinion).
25
Id. at 104–05.
26
Id. at 105.
27
Id. at 103–05. Justice Stevens also canvassed the rule’s history since 1883, when it was first
promulgated. Finding no explicit congressional and presidential sanction for the rule, notwithstanding its
age, Justice Stevens made the anti-Burkean point that the rule’s longevity yielded a paradoxical ground
for distrust. Id. at 107–08. At the time the rule was adopted, he explained, “there was no doubt a greater
inclination than we can now accept to regard ‘foreigners’ as a somewhat less desirable class of persons
than American citizens.” Id. at 107. This turns on its head the more typical invocation of tradition by
both courts and the Executive Branch as a positive justification for an outcome. See, e.g., Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826–28 (1997) (emphasizing the importance of “historical practice”); Memorandum
from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Attorneys of the
Office, Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 2 (July 16, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf (“Particularly where the question relates to
the authorities of the President or other executive officers or the allocation of powers between the
Branches of the Government, precedent and historical practice are often of special relevance.”).
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acceptance was insufficient to save the rule.28 (As we shall see, that hint was
never followed.) At minimum, it seemed reasonably clear at the opinion’s
close that no component of the federal government lacking a statutory
mandate for national security or foreign relations matters could promulgate
a rule that facially discriminated on the basis of alienage to further those
ends. It was also clear that a necessary, but perhaps not sufficient,
requirement for categorical distinctions on alienage grounds was that the
federal agency engaging in line drawing had competence respecting the
policy justifications at issue.
On the day it was decided, Hampton’s generative potential was
unclear. From one perspective, the decision only applied to the federal
government, and only in challenges to alienage classifications. It could be
posited that on matters of race, where the range of permissible justifications
for classification was much narrower than on matters of alienage, there was
no need for such an indirect judicial implement. The courts, however
ineptly, could apply searching scrutiny to all race-based classifications.29 If
the logic of Hampton were confined to the federal context, and limited to
alienage-based classifications, its significance would be small indeed.
But on another view, Justice Stevens’s opinion could have been viewed
as the seed of a more generally applicable canon. Recall that the
Constitution’s equality guarantee, like other constitutional rights, is not an
absolute protection against governmental action.30 Equality claims typically
operate as partial “shields,” not “trumps,” in American constitutional law.31
Even the most disfavored of intrusions on equality can be authorized if it
satisfies the rigorous test of strict scrutiny.32 Hampton can be understood as
a mechanism for implementing the constitutional balancing test. Rather
28

Hampton, 426 U.S. at 105, 116; cf. id. at 117 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring) (flagging that
reserved question).
29
The Court first examined a race-based federal action in Hirabayashi v. United States, in which it
upheld a curfew applicable only to persons of Japanese ancestry on the ground that “circumstances
within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for maintaining the national defense
afforded a rational basis for the decision which they made.” 320 U.S. 81, 102 (1943). Only in Korematsu
v. United States, a case concerning internment orders that followed the curfew, did the Court declare that
it would apply “the most rigid scrutiny.” 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Of course, Korematsu upheld the
internment legislation under that standard of review. Id. at 224.
30
For a general statement of this claim as applied to all constitutional rights, see Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343, 344 (1993) (“[R]ights are
conceptually interconnected with, and occasionally even subordinate to, governmental powers.”).
31
See Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 789, 791–92 (2007)
(“Rights are protective ‘shields,’ rather than peremptory ‘trumps,’ against conflicting, nonenumerated
governmental interests, with courts balancing the two by applying one of several different presumptions
and standards of review, such as strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and the rational basis test.”
(footnote omitted) (quoting Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV.
415, 431 (1993))).
32
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 946
(1987) (asserting that compelling-state-interest tests “exemplify” a “form” of balancing).
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than asking whether the government’s action is animated by a compelling
or an important state interest, the court would ask whether the component of
the government that took the action is responsible for furthering the state
interest is at issue. Justice Stevens’s opinion presents at least one
justification for this tack: absent evidence that the institutional mandate of
the government actor conduces to “some degree of expertise,” there is cause
for judicial skepticism of the bona fides of the government action.33 Judicial
“matching” of state interest to the component’s policy competency is an
epistemically less demanding inquiry, moreover, than the question whether
a specific goal is in fact furthered by a government policy. So institution
matching serves as a lower cost heuristic for determining whether a rightsinfringing action should be ratified by the federal courts.
Hampton, to be sure, is not pellucidly clear as to how such a generally
applicable doctrinal mechanism would work. As a threshold matter, it is not
apparent from Justice Stevens’s opinion how to evaluate the match between
the agency’s mission and the relevant government interest. The analysis in
Hampton identified the CSC’s scope of competence by examining and
paraphrasing its organic statute.34 That is, it seemed to proceed along
relatively formalist tracks. But it is not clear whether an agency’s organic
statute should be the only relevant information on this score, or whether
information about the agency’s past actions and current staffing should also
count.35 Such evidence in a particular case could suggest a failure to apply
salient expertise even if the agency is more generally recognized by statute
as competent. In addition, a court could look at what an agency does, for
example by asking whether it consulted with other, more expert colleagues
in other departments.36 These are ways for a court to adapt a more
functionalist approach to institution matching.
If statutes are indeed the sole source of relevant information for judges,
there remain questions of how clearly the text must speak to a policy
question in order to pass muster (even aside from the question of how
appellate judges will calibrate judgments of clarity in a way that conveys
clear instructions to courts lower in the federal hierarchy). For example, a
33

Hampton, 426 U.S. at 115.
Id. at 114 & n.47 (“The only concern of the Civil Service Commission is the promotion of an
efficient federal service.”).
35
In one later opinion, Justice Stevens suggested his abiding concern for the actual reasons for a
government action. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217–19, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). In
a further case, he declined to speculate about Congress’s justifications for a rule that discriminated
among different groups of Delaware Indians for no apparent reason and instead voted to invalidate the
statute based on the absence of “principled justification.” Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S.
73, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36
Cf. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE 206 (1988) (criticizing Hampton on the ground that
the invalidated rule was “undoubtedly produced after a study by members of the Commission’s staff,
who most certainly consulted both formally and informally with members of other staffs knowledgeable
about foreign policy”).
34
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court might determine that Congress must speak especially clearly as to the
expertise issue, or that ambiguous textual instructions would suffice as a
basis for concluding that legislators believed an agency would possess
sufficient expertise.37
Nor does the formalist–functionalist choice exhaust the puzzles raised
by institution matching. In a larger context, it is also unclear whether the
institution matching canon is a substitute for direct enforcement of the
relevant constitutional interest—equal protection in Hampton—or a
complement to such enforcement. After an agency’s action is invalidated on
institution matching grounds, and a different component of the government
has stepped into the breach to consider the issue, is further constitutional
challenge precluded?38
Hampton does not answer these questions. Principles and doctrinal
mechanisms of constitutional law typically emerge in an incremental
“common law” form.39 Had Hampton been taken up and elaborated as
constitutional common law, such uncertainties might have been confronted
and resolved incrementally over time. It should be no surprise they were
unresolved in a single judicial opinion. Hampton rather simply introduced
in inchoate form the doctrinal device of institution matching. That canon
might have use whenever a court tries to determine whether the reasons
offered by the government for narrowing an equality or liberty interest are
sufficiently compelling. By looking to the government actor’s mandate, the
court employs a less epistemically demanding heuristic for assessing the
validity of a proffered state interest. Hampton’s invocation of institution
matching left open many implementation questions. It also raised the
question whether the effort needed to clarify Justice Stevens’s innovation
was worthwhile. Was this really a new doctrinal tool, or merely a retread of
familiar devices in the Court’s toolkit? How new, in fact, was institution
matching?
B. Institution Matching Distinguished from the Substantive Canons
To assess Hampton’s novelty, it is helpful to situate the logic of
institution matching within a family of doctrinal tools used by federal
judges to infuse adjudication and statutory interpretation with
extrastatutory, constitutional values without direct, unmediated application
37

One might also query whether the canon should apply in different ways to liberty and equality
interests. But Hampton provides little reason to believe that these should be separate lines of analysis.
To the contrary, as Justice Rehnquist observed in dissent, the opinion conflates liberty and equality
interests. 426 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38
Note also the question of what happens when there is no agency that has both the statutory
competence to take the relevant decision and also the expertise deemed salient to the constitutional
question. For a discussion of this problem, see infra text accompanying notes 231–34.
39
See Strauss, supra note 1, at 925 (associating the common law method with “incremental
change”).
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of a constitutional principle. These so-called “substantive canons”40—which
include the avoidance canon, clear statement rules, and pro-deliberation
canons—achieve constitutional goals indirectly through a variety of
mechanisms.41 They also all eschew the blunt instrument of invalidation.
Yet institution matching is distinct. Unlike these other canons, it exploits
the relationship between the justifications for infringing constitutional
rights and the institutional competences of a governmental entity tasked
with that potential infringement. It is therefore plausible to think that
institution matching supplements the familiar array of doctrinal tools used
to enforce constitutional norms indirectly.
The distinction between institution matching and more familiar canons
can be seen by fleshing about the basic mechanisms underlying the latter.
Two commonly employed mechanisms for indirect enforcement of
constitutional norms are the avoidance canon and its close cousin the clear
statement rule.42 Interpreting federal statutes, a federal court can invoke a
constitutional norm as a weak presumption or “rule of thumb” as a starting
point of discussion or as a tiebreaker.43 Or it can impose a more robust clear
statement rule that can be rebutted only by unequivocal statutory
language.44 These presumptions, respectively weak and strong, may be
deployed to further individual rights or structural principles. The Court
applies them, for example, to disfavor derogation of the President’s
traditional powers,45 to favor judicial review,46 or to shield First Amendment
values.47
The avoidance canon and clear statement rules promote constitutional
values via four possible mechanisms. One possibility is that the Court is
40

William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term—Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 68–69 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2111 (1990) (noting how canons often rely on “something external
to legislative desires”).
41
Cf. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking,
118 YALE L.J. 64, 89–96 (2008) (emphasizing the diverse ways in which canons operate).
42
For an overview of the Roberts Court’s usage of the avoidance canon, see Richard L. Hasen,
Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 189–95.
43
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2891 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
44
Id.; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 883–85 (4th ed. 2007)
(drawing the same distinction).
45
See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291–
92 (1981).
46
See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (requiring a clear statement from Congress
before concluding that jurisdiction to review an agency action had been eliminated); Abbot Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–40 (1967) (declining to read a statute as limiting judicial review in like
fashion).
47
See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1979) (requiring a clear
statement of statutory authority for an agency action that impinged on First Amendment interests);
United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1957) (articulating the avoidance principle).
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using the clarity of statutory text as a proxy for the probability that
Congress intended to “press[] the envelope of constitutional validity.”48 On
this account, Congress acts with full awareness of constitutional limitations.
Courts presume that legislators wish to approach constitutional limits only
when they do so with linguistic precision.49 An alternative explanation for
avoidance canons rejects the idea that the presumption is a way of tracking
congressional intent.50 Rather, a judicial demand for linguistic clarity is in
effect a tax on the enactment of constitutionally problematic statutes. It is
more costly, in time and effort, for legislators to craft clear language than it
is for them to agree on generalities. The statutory presumptions thereby
serve as a “resistance norm,” creating frictional enactment costs that make
passage of constitutionally troubling laws less likely.51 A similar logic
underpins the hard look doctrine in administrative law. In both domains, the
“court . . . reason[s] that the expert government decisionmaker’s willingness
to produce a high-quality explanation signals that the government believes
the benefits of the proposed policy are high.”52
A third explanation for avoidance canons and clear statement rules
turns on the judicial “underenforcement” of constitutional norms due to
institutional constraints on judicial factfinding and enforcement.53 Proleptic
invocation of constitutional concerns in the course of statutory
interpretation is a way for courts to compensate for their inability to observe
directly and respond to the full spectrum of constitutional violations.54 This
48

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (plurality opinion); accord Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465–66 (1989); see also
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005) (“The canon is thus a means of giving effect to
congressional intent, not of subverting it.”).
49
This assumes that the constitutional limitation was clear at the time a statute was enacted—which
likely was not the case with the part of the Clean Water Act at issue in Rapanos. Cf. Rapanos, 547 U.S.
at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50
It is not clear why Congress would want more linguistic clarity as it approached the constitutional
boundary, unless legislators were anticipating a judicial demand for such clarity. The Rapanos
explanation for clear statement rules thus appears to be circular. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander
Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74 (“[I]t is by no means clear that a strained interpretation of a federal
statute that avoids a constitutional question is any less a judicial intrusion than the judicial invalidation
on constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation of the same statute.”).
51
Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial
Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1585–87 (2000); accord Manning, supra note 5, at 403 (using the term
“clarity tax”); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the
Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 41–42 (2008) (cataloging
“enactment costs” imposed by clear statement rules).
52
Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN.
L. REV. 753, 755 (2006).
53
For the idea of “underenforced norms,” see Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978).
54
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) (noting that clear statement
rules protect constitutional values that otherwise would not be directly judicially enforced); see also
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justification for constitutionally inspired presumptions has provoked critics
to worry about their unwarranted “penumbra” effect,55 or to complain that
judges should not “load the dice” by manipulating the enactment costs of
different statutory options.56
A final explanation turns on institutional competence concerns: by
setting the default for statutory interpretation to favor a constitutional value,
courts in effect remand cases to the legislature when an ambiguous statute
implicates constitutionally sensitive matters. Judges thereby ensure that it is
the more democratic entity that is unequivocally allocated the necessary
hard decision.57 Focusing on this democracy-promoting logic, some scholars
categorize avoidance and its ilk as latter-day forms of the “nondelegation”
doctrine.58
None of these explanations for avoidance and its kin map precisely
onto the logic of institution matching. As an initial matter, the avoidance
canon and its kin focus on the legislative process, not the decisionmaking
procedures or protocols of the Executive. They seek either to identify
occasions that legislators have seriously considered constitutional concerns,
or to stimulate such deliberation either through “remands” of statutes or by
the manipulation of enactment costs. For example, by refusing to allow an
agency to initiate a policy that may have constitutional ramifications until it
has clear legislative license, the Court ensures that Congress as the
appropriately credentialed democratic decisionmaker has determined that
such action is appropriate given the risk to constitutional values.59 These
canons, however, furnish no means of testing directly the government’s
justifications for narrowing a constitutional right. They focus on process per
se. The institution matching canon, by contrast, uses process as a direct
proxy for the merits of a governmental decision.
It is worth noting that enactment-cost explanations of avoidance
canons might also be understood as attempts to use the quality of
deliberative process as a proxy for the validity of a constitutional decision.

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467–70 (1991) (using a clear statement rule to shield states’ ability
to determine the forms of their own government structures, a federalism value not directly enforced by
the Court).
55
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 800, 816 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 27 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
57
See Bamberger, supra note 41, at 88.
58
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000); see also Solid Waste
Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2000) (federalism); FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 190–91 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 130 (1958) (First Amendment concerns).
59
See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1979) (refusing to allow
agency to take an action that might have limited First Amendment free exercise rights).
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That is, the court assumes that a constitutionally sensitive decision is truly
warranted only when the legislature has paid a high enactment price.60 But it
is not clear why one would believe that a greater legislative willingness to
expend time and effort on statutory clarity alone will proxy for valid
empirical justifications for narrowing a constitutional entitlement. It may
also be that increased expenditure of legislative effort correlates with the
special hostility felt toward a protected class where, for example, equal
protection or free exercise concerns are at stake. The enactment-cost
explanation for the avoidance canon, in this case, would have the odd
consequence in the individual-rights context of endorsing animus-driven
measures against the most despised of protected classes, while sheltering
those protected classes that elicit only mild contempt from legislators.
Whatever one makes of this peculiar outcome, semantic clarity is simply
not reliably correlated with the credibility of the government’s underlying
non-animus-related justifications. The enactment-cost account of avoidance
is better understood not to rely on the presumption that process tracks
quality, but instead to rest on a claim that judicial review will create ex ante
incentives for greater statutory clarity. Institution matching makes no such
claim and so works through a different mechanism from enactment-costbased canons.
The same is true for other statutory presumptions and devices, such as
deliberation-forcing norms. The latter target problems and epistemic
difficulties that are distinct from the matching problem Hampton addressed.
For example, there are a number of public law doctrines that demand
reasoned explanations from agencies61 or Congress62 as the price of judicial
endorsement of certain actions. Unlike institution matching, such reasonedexplanation demands mitigate the epistemic burden on courts by promoting
ex ante the production of relevant factual material concerning a law.63
Reasoned-explanation demands are also a prophylactic against interestgroup capture: by compelling the production of a public-regarding reason
for a law, and possibly evidence to support that reason, they make pure

60

For an example of how this might work in practice, see Stephenson, supra note 51, at 12.
See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(noting the need for a “satisfactory explanation” for agency decisions); cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (requiring a “searching and careful” review of agency
decisionmaking).
62
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562–63 (1995) (suggesting that congressional
findings, though not required, may be useful in Commerce Clause cases when such findings “would
enable [the Court] to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected
interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye”); accord
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 528–29 (2004). The Court has said, however, that neither the quality
nor quantity of the legislative record is necessarily dispositive in the constitutional inquiry. See Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646 (1999).
63
Stephenson, supra note 51, at 48 & n.121.
61
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rent-seeking potentially less rewarding.64 Deliberation-forcing rules thus
allow courts to assess directly the government’s reasons in a way that
institution matching does not. They also respond to interest-group-capture
problems in a way that institution matching cannot.
I do not wish to exaggerate the point being pressed here. My claim
here is simply that the Hampton institution matching canon serves
constitutional ends through subtly different means from other, more
familiar canons. It is therefore a distinctive, although not in all regards
superior, contribution to the federal judiciary’s constitutional toolkit.
II. THE BRIEF LIFE AND LONG DECLINE OF INSTITUTION MATCHING:
THE STANDARD ACCOUNT
This Part demonstrates that to the extent lawyers and scholars are
aware of it, the rule of Hampton is viewed as a dead end in the law. To pick
but one example, an important casebook, in excerpting Justice Stevens’s
opinion, states dourly that Hampton “has never directly controlled the result
in any subsequent Supreme Court decision.”65 Indeed, the decision’s
aftermath and post-history provided scant cause for optimism. On either
score, Hampton seemed to expire before it could generate new precedent
beyond the confines of the specific facts of that case.
Before developing these points, it is worth raising and rejecting one
hypothesis. Some have suggested that the circumstances of Hampton’s
hand-down provide ground for skepticism of its enduring impact. The case
had been held over from the previous Term. According to one secondhand
account, the case, once argued, was assigned by Justice Brennan to Justice
Stevens. Justice Stevens drafted in line with his own theory of the case,
which no other Justice shared.66 Although the four remaining members of
the majority did not “technically” agree with his reasoning, they signed on
to Justice Stevens’s first opinion.67 At a minimum, this does not suggest
broad and deep support for institution matching.
The available archival evidence, however, does not support this
account. Correspondence between the Justices suggests that both Justices
Powell and Stewart understood and approved of the Stevens opinion’s
institution matching logic. Hence, on March 17, 1976, Justice Powell
responded to Justice Stevens’s Hampton draft with a memo commending

64

Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War over
Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 675 (1992).
65
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 44, at 425–26.
66
BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE 203 (2010)
(“Stevens’s opinion addressed a slightly different question than the one posed either by the U.S. Civil
Service Commission in bringing the case or the other [J]ustices.”).
67
BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 402 (1979).
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him for his “fine” opinion.68 Two weeks later, Justice Potter Stewart sent
Justice Stevens a letter parsing the initial draft, and arguing that it could
more cleanly focus on the question whether the challenged decision was
“made by an office having the responsibility for fostering the interest at
stake.”69 Stewart cautioned against the unwarranted implication of the draft
that there might be “a constitutionally protected liberty interest in eligibility
for employment in a major sector of the economy.”70 Two days later, Justice
Stevens responded to Justice Stewart with two clarifications. First, he
explained that even if the Commission “had expressly relied on national
interest relating to immigration,” its decision would still have been invalid
under the opinion’s logic.71 Second, Stevens explained that his argument did
not merely turn on the formal characteristics of the CSC’s delegated
authority. Rather, given the CSC rule’s “significant impact on a liberty
interest,” he felt the Court had to be “sure it was adopted for an appropriate
reason by an appropriate decision maker.”72 This correspondence strongly
suggests two things. First, Justice Stevens was quite conscious of his
doctrinal novation, even if it was not fully developed on the surface of the
Hampton opinion. Second, other Justices were also aware of the institution
matching logic and yet did not file separate concurrences to reject it in
whole or in part.
A.
Hampton’s Immediate Consequences
Consider first the immediate aftermath of the CSC rule invalidated by
the Court. Three months after the Hampton decision, President Gerald Ford
promulgated an executive order categorically prohibiting federal
employment of aliens pending congressional reconsideration of the
question.73 Lower courts affirmed President Ford’s decision, and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari review with Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and White voting unsuccessfully to hear the case.74 White House
reenactment of the alienage bar did not rest on substantial foreign policy or
national security grounds. To the contrary, documents uncovered by
Professor Alexander Aleinikoff suggest that the reasons for the renewed
68

See Letter from Justice Lewis Powell to Justice John Paul Stevens 1 (Mar. 17, 1976) (in Library
of Congress, Blackmun Papers, Box 212, Folder 3, No. 73-1596, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong
[hereinafter Blackmun Papers Box 212] and on file with author).
69
Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice John Paul Stevens 2 (Apr. 14, 1976) (in Blackmun
Papers Box 212 and on file with author).
70
Id.
71
Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Potter Stewart 1 (Apr. 16, 1976) (in Blackmun
Papers Box 212 and on file with author).
72
Id.
73
41 Fed. Reg. 37,303–04 (Sept. 3, 1976).
74
Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 435 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff’d sub nom. Mow Sun Wong
v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Lum v. Campbell, 450 U.S. 959
(1981).
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rule were hardly so worthy.75 Upon being asked for comments as to the
proposed Ford order, the Postal Service had indicated it had no difficulty in
employing resident aliens, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development argued for a more tailored rule, and the Department of State
expressed doubts about the wisdom of an absolute prohibition.76 A
memorandum from the general counsel of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) explained that the CSC’s foreign policy justifications for the
alienage restriction were “more apparent than real”—but there was “a
widespread visceral feeling that Government jobs should be reserved for
citizens.”77 That the OMB labeled the sentiment underlying the bar
“visceral” suggests not only that the opposition to aliens’ employment was
deeply held but also that it was based on an instinctual distaste for a certain
class—precisely the kind of motivation that the Constitution’s equality
protection is intended to oust from government decisionmaking.
To the extent that the aim of the institution matching canon was to
ensure that an “overlooked [constitutional] value” was accounted for fully
in political branch deliberations, the post-history of Hampton gives no
ground for optimism.78 Instead, the history suggests that institution
matching does not preclude the challenged government decision from
proceeding apace via a different institutional vehicle.
B. Hampton’s Reception as Precedent
Nor does the path of Hampton in the Supreme Court’s subsequent case
law suggest that institution matching has had much impact on constitutional
doctrine. To be sure, Hampton was well received by academic
commentators. For example, building on work by (later Justice) Hans
Linde, Professor Lawrence Sager cited Hampton as an example of a novel
“due process of lawmaking” approach to constitutional decisionmaking.79
By effectively remanding the CSC’s decision for reconsideration, Sager
pointed out, the Court had evaded the twin dangers of endorsing a
75

See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 44, at 424–25 (describing Aleinikoff’s research and findings).
Id. at 424.
77
Id. at 424–25 (quoting Memorandum from William N. Nichols, Gen. Counsel, Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, to Robert D. Linden, White House Chief Exec. Clerk (Aug. 30, 1976) (on file in Gerald R. Ford
Library, Ann Arbor, MI)).
78
Tushnet, supra note 9, at 2795. The post-history of Hampton undermines Tushnet’s 1988 critique
that the initial CSC decision was likely based on expertise. See supra text accompanying notes 73–77.
79
Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1417–18 (1978). The year that Hampton was
decided, Linde had published an article arguing for “rational lawmaking[, which] means that a judge is
to assess the challenged law in relation to actual, not merely conjectural, purposes, and that he is
similarly to gauge the reasonableness of doubtful means by realistic materials in the record and not by
hypothetical rationalization.” Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 222
(1976); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 302–03,
306 (1975) (commending forms of judicial review that will spur “dialogue”).
76
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potentially troubling rule without full information and of prohibiting the
government from a policy choice with weighty justifications.80 Hampton,
explained Sager, honored the plaintiffs’ right to a “reasonable determination
made by an appropriate tribunal of the federal government.”81 Subsequently,
Professor Cass Sunstein favorably conscripted Hampton into his large camp
of minimalist decisions.82
Notwithstanding growing academic interest in so-called dialogic forms
of judicial review in the decades that followed,83 the Court seemingly did
not take up Hampton’s invitation. Individual Justices such as Lewis Powell
and Byron White cited the case in ways that seemingly approved of its basic
logic, but not in majority opinions.84 Justice Stevens himself would look
back to Hampton occasionally as authority for the more abstract proposition
that government must “govern impartially”85 and for the claim that
restrictions on constitutional interests can be authorized only on the basis of
real, not hypothesized, justifications for the government’s actions.86 His
concern with the correct institutional locus of a decision also informed his
opinion in Bowsher v. Synar,87 wherein the Court invalidated the “reporting
provisions” of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985. The Act granted the Comptroller General authority to mandate

80

Sager, supra note 79, at 1417.
Id. at 1414.
82
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 35
(1999).
83
For a brief overview of the literature, see Rosalind Dixon, The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter
Dialogue, and Deference, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 235, 238 (2009).
84
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 308–09 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.);
N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 569, 609 n.15 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
85
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 636 n.2 (1986) (citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,
100 (1976)); accord Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 548 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
BARNHART & SCHLICKMAN, supra note 66 (noting that the virtue of governing impartially is one of the
“building blocks” of Stevens’s jurisprudence).
86
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 675–76 (1988). In City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., Justice Stevens also made the argument that “fundamental
choices” must be made by “a responsible organ of government.” 426 U.S. 668, 688 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 256 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
Justice Stevens then made a similar argument in his dissent in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
476 U.S. 267, 315–16 (1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (finding “a rational and unquestionably legitimate
basis for” the challenged decision). At first blush, this passage in Wygant seems in tension with Justice
Stevens’s dissent in Fullilove, in which he voted to invalidate a federal statutory provision that favored
“minority business enterprises.” 448 U.S. at 553–54. The different positions on affirmative action that
Justice Stevens took in the two cases can be reconciled by noting that in Wygant he found tailored
justifications for the challenged state action, and in Fullilove he did not. See also Madsen v. Women’s
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 778–79 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(contending that a legislatively imposed speech ban would be reviewed under a stricter standard than a
judicially crafted injunction because the latter is necessarily more tailored, and emphasizing the “three
days of testimony” gathered by the trial judge in the case at bar before issuing the injunction).
87
478 U.S. 714, 718, 736 (1986).
81
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spending reductions once a budget had been enacted.88 Voting to invalidate
those provisions, Justice Stevens invoked “due process of lawmaking”
concerns at their acme when “a legislature’s agent is given powers to act
without even the formalities of the legislative process.”89
At first blush then, the standard account of Hampton appears
compelling: despite some early enthusiasm from scholars, the decision
seems not to have generated subsequent constitutional precedent. To the
contrary, the post-history of the Hampton litigation itself seems to cast
doubt on its value as a tool of constitutional adjudication.90 However much
potential institution matching may initially have had, it seems for all intents
and purposes to have fallen into long and irremediable desuetude.
III. THE SURPRISING PERSISTENCE OF INSTITUTION MATCHING
But institution matching has not vanished from constitutional doctrine.
Instead, it appears in unexpected forms. This Part presents three examples
of the institution matching canon recently at work in diverse areas of public
law—administrative law, criminal law, and national security law. Perhaps
because these examples are heterogeneous, their relationship with each
other has not been noticed. Nevertheless, in each line of cases, the essential
element of institution matching—first glimpsed in Hampton—of testing the
strength of the government’s reasons by examining whether a decision was
“adopted for an appropriate reason by an appropriate decision maker”91 can
be discerned in the Court’s arguments.
More specifically, there are four common elements in each of the cases
limned below that can be usefully adumbrated at the threshold. First, each
case involves an individual interest in some form of liberty or equality.
Upon a sufficient showing by the government, however, it is undisputed
that the individual entitlement can be abrogated. As a result, each of the
cases in some measure presents a matching problem: Are the government’s
justifications for, say, restricting the liberty interest sufficient? Second, the
result in each case turns upon the identity of the governmental
decisionmaker. The Court’s rulings in these cases, that is, turn on a “who”
and not a “how” inquiry.92 Third, the institution matching canon is applied
in each case to the selection of governmental actor within a specific branch,
rather than to the decision about which branch should act. Institution
88

Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251, 99 Stat.
1038, 1063–72 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901, 907, 922 (2006)).
89
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 757 n.23 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90
Cf. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 100 n.3 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(recounting the post-history of Hampton as support for the proposition that the government has broad
discretion as to employment decisions).
91
Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Potter Stewart, supra note 71, at 1.
92
Cf. Coenen, Pros and Cons, supra note 9, at 8–14, 18–19 (distinguishing these two kinds of
decision procedures).
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matching thus is conceptually separate from the separation of powers.
Finally, while the particular litigant’s challenge to a government decision
may prevail in a given case, the state still has authority to revise its
procedures and to reallocate decisional authority in a fashion that conforms
with the Court’s instructions. As in Hampton, the Court leaves the door
open to a fresh decision made by the correctly situated element of
government. While the government loses this round, it has the opportunity
to rework a decision in a form that may obtain a subsequent court’s
approval.
A. Institution Matching in Criminal Law
Perhaps the most practically consequential recent doctrinal innovation
in criminal procedure is an application of Hampton’s institution matching
canon. The new rule was developed in a line of precedent beginning in 2000
with Apprendi v. New Jersey.93 In cases beginning with Apprendi and
culminating in United States v. Booker,94 the Court held that a criminal
defendant has a right to a jury determination of any fact (other than a prior
conviction) that is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum
authorized by the facts established by a guilty plea or jury verdict.95 In
Booker, a five-Justice majority, with Justice Stevens writing, held that this
principle applied to the federal sentencing guidelines; a different fiveJustice majority, with Justice Breyer at the helm, held that the provision of
the federal sentencing statute making the guidelines mandatory could be
severed, leaving the guidelines “effectively advisory.”96
The principle articulated in Apprendi and applied in Booker relies on
the distinctive role of the jury in calibrating exposure to criminal
punishment.97 Whether this elevation of the jury has an adequate historical
pedigree remains the subject of sharp disagreement.98 The Apprendi
principle’s intended effect, nevertheless, is to promote public (i.e., jury)
“control” of the punishment function in criminal cases.99 In this sense, the
93

530 U.S. 466 (2000).
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
95
Id. at 244 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part); see also Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (extending Apprendi to the capital sentencing context); United States v. Harris,
536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002) (finding Apprendi inapplicable to mandatory minimums).
96
Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
97
See id. at 236 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part) (criticizing the pre-Booker
federal regime because its “increas[ed] emphasis on facts that enhanced sentencing
ranges . . . increase[d] the judge’s power and diminish[ed] that of the jury”).
98
Compare AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 234 (2005)
(emphasizing the distinctive function of the jury as a restraint on government power), with Kevin R.
Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1082, 1093 (2005) (“[T]he Court’s underlying theory of jury as privileged fact finder in
punishment determinations is also a constitutional novelty . . . .”).
99
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
94
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Apprendi decision concerns the institutional locus of decisionmaking
authority within the criminal trial. At bottom, it relies on a notion of
“matching” those factual determinations the Court views as pivotal in the
context of criminal adjudication to the body best suited to making such
determinations.
Apprendi is commonly understood to turn on the jury’s role because it
is a Sixth Amendment case.100 It is less often noted that Justice Stevens’s
opinion in Apprendi, like his Hampton opinion, invokes due process
grounds too.101 Due process and the Sixth Amendment converge because of
the institutional match between the jury and the determination to expand a
defendant’s exposure to criminal sanction. But Apprendi does not rest on
the claim that the jury is especially epistemically competent to make
narrowly understood factual determinations. To the contrary, the Federal
Rules of Evidence’s hearsay and prejudice rules imply that juries are more
prone to conceptual distortions and cognitive biases than judges.102 The
allocation of decisional authority in Apprendi instead reflects the jury’s
superior competence to make a certain genre of normatively inflected
judgments. This is the belief, expressed elsewhere by Justice Stevens, that
juries are “best able to express the conscience of the community.”103 To a
greater extent than judges, juries “reflect more accurately the composition
and experiences of the community as a whole, and inevitably make
decisions based on community values more reliably” than judges.104 Put
another way, juries are well positioned to determine when a morally
charged “societal stigma” is appropriately imposed.105 They are “expert” on
what the community thinks. By contrast, judges are institutionally, and
perhaps temperamentally, incapacitated from serving as vehicles for a larger
community’s contextualized normative judgments. The Apprendi principle
thus ensures a match between a class of normatively charged factual
determinations and the body best able to make such determinations.106

100

See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Policing Politics in
Sentencing, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (2009); Jonathan F. Mitchell, Apprendi’s Domain,
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 297, 297–99.
101
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (citing the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
102
See, e.g., Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s Performance as
a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 904–21 (1998) (reporting empirical research suggesting judges
are less prone to certain cognitive biases than juries). But see Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and
Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867
passim (1999) (questioning the quality and the interpretation of the empirical evidence used in Hastie &
Viscusi’s study).
103
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 470 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
104
Id. at 486–87.
105
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484–85.
106
While neither Apprendi nor its progeny are wholly clear as to whether or not the Court is
speaking of actual as opposed to idealized jurors, the application of the principle to cases in which no
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Apprendi in the trenches has not been adjudged a success.107 The Court
has not applied the institution matching in a coherent fashion to determinate
sentencing regimes such as the federal guidelines. Rather, Booker’s
substantive holding that the guidelines vested too much authority in federal
judges was hitched uncomfortably to a remedial holding that kept largely
intact the judicial sentencing role and that simultaneously loosened
constraints previously imposed upon the bench.108 At best this result is
counterintuitive; worse, it may create new, unjustified disparities in
sentencing outcomes.109 The perceived failure of Apprendi in the federal
sphere, though, is a consequence of the unusual distribution of votes in
Booker, not an inevitable consequence of the principle itself. Had the Court
applied the Apprendi principle to the outer bounds of its basic logic, the
results surely would have been different.110 Whatever criticisms Apprendi
and Booker merit based on their destabilizing effects or incoherent results
do not impeach the observation that the Apprendi principle at heart is an
effort to take seriously the possibility of institution matching in the criminal
adjudication process.
B. Institution Matching in Administrative Law
Administrative law supplies a second example of institution matching.
A central question in modern administrative law concerns the degree of
deference courts accord to federal agencies’ interpretations of federal

jury in fact sat suggests the Court’s logic is best understood as resting on a relatively abstract and
idealized view of juries.
107
See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System,
43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 342, 371–72 (2006) (“If writing on a blank slate, few would likely advocate the
precise sentencing system resulting from the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker.”).
108
See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
37, 53 (2006) (“The [Booker] decision effectively endorsed the lax sentencing procedures that the
federal system had used for two decades even while finding those procedures constitutionally
problematic.”). The peculiar result in Booker is a result of Justice Ginsburg’s decision to vote with
Justice Stevens on the substantive holding and with Justice Breyer on the remedy.
109
Id.; see also Jonathan Masur, Booker Reconsidered, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1091, 1109 (2010)
(explaining that Booker’s remedial effect is to shift sentencing policymaking from the centralized
Sentencing Commission to the dispersed pool of federal district court judges, and concluding this
change will be “costly in the net”); Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the
Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 732–
40 (2008) (finding post-Booker sentencing disparities based on the political affiliation of the judge and
the particular circuit). The remedial holding of Booker might also be characterized as a form of
institution matching: individual judges have greater competence to issue a sentence that conforms to the
equities of a given case than the Sentencing Commission does. Of course, this reading is in tension with
the original centralizing impulse of the Guidelines, which were meant to strip authority from sentencing
judges.
110
Cf. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 519–20 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)
(noting that the principle also cast into doubt the federal parole system and precedential judicial
sentencing rules).
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statutes.111 That seemingly binary problem of interbranch relations,
however, has generated a briar patch of doctrinal tests.112 One of the ways in
which the deference question is decided turns on how authority is
distributed within the Executive Branch. And to reach judgments about
such intrabranch arrangements, the Court has applied the logic of institution
matching.
The body of law and statutes addressing the division of authority
between courts and agencies is complex. Its keystone is Justice Stevens’s
opinion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC.113 The Chevron Court announced
a two-step process that courts must follow in reviewing federal agencies’
interpretations of federal statutes: Has Congress “directly spoken” to the
question, and, if not, is the agency’s answer “based on a permissible
construction of the statute”?114 Both steps direct attention to the agency’s
regulatory work product. Arguably, the two steps blur into “a single inquiry
into the reasonableness of the agency’s statutory framework.”115 But the
Court has added to the familiar Chevron two-step an additional, antecedent
question: Does the agency even have the interpretive authority, and has it
wielded such authority, in the case at hand?116 Scholars have labeled this
analysis “Chevron step zero.”117 Speaking to that threshold question, the
Court has promulgated guidelines, but not directive rules, about how lower
courts should draw Chevron’s outer boundary. It has suggested, for
example, that an agency’s interpretation lacking “the force of law” does not
receive deference from a federal judge.118 The products of formal
rulemaking and adjudication sometimes, but not always, receive
deference.119 The Court’s instructions on the step zero question have thus
111

See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
969–70 (1992) (describing sweeping consequences of varying the degree of judicial deference).
112
See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 835–36
(2001) (describing some of these tests).
113
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
114
Id. at 842–43.
115
Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597,
598 (2009). Some commentators have read Chevron step two as training on the manner in which the
agency has reached a decision, but this risks redundancy with separate administrative law doctrines that
formally train on the agency’s processes. Id. at 602–03.
116
The Court framed this question in a 2000–2002 trilogy of cases. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535
U.S. 212 (2002); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529
U.S. 576 (2000).
117
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207–19 (2006); see also Merrill &
Hickman, supra note 112, at 835 (framing the question as “what exactly is Chevron’s domain?”).
118
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587; accord Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
119
Compare Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (yes), with Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222 (not always), and Nat’l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1004–05 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he existence of a formal rulemaking proceeding is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for . . . Chevron deference . . . .”). Justice Stevens has long been a proponent of flexibility in
the threshold determination whether Chevron applies. See, e.g., Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of
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been far from comprehensive or categorical. There remains much
uncertainty about the step zero test.120
As a result, Chevron step zero serves as a placeholder for a range of
judicial concerns—and has thereby opened the door to institution matching.
Consider in this regard Gonzales v. Oregon, in which the Court invalidated
an interpretative rule promulgated by Attorney General John Ashcroft that
exposed physicians assisting the suicide of terminally ill patients to federal
criminal penalties.121 The Ashcroft Rule was a response to the Oregon Death
with Dignity Act, adopted by referendum in 1994.122 The Oregon Act
established procedures through which terminally ill patients could request
medication to end their lives. The medications prescribed under the Death
with Dignity Act, however, were also regulated pursuant to the federal
Controlled Substances Act (CSA).123 Under a 1971 regulation promulgated
by the Attorney General pursuant to the CSA, some substances controlled
under the Act could be prescribed “by an individual practitioner acting in
the usual course of his professional practice.”124 In November 2001,
however, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an “interpretive rule” that
glossed the 1971 regulation to the effect that “assisting suicide [was] not a
‘legitimate medical purpose’” under the CSA.125 The Ashcroft Rule thereby
claimed to render illegal under federal criminal law conduct that was
otherwise permissible under Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act. Ashcroft
appended to the rule a legal opinion from the Justice Department’s Office of
Legal Counsel to support his determination that assisting suicide was not a
“legitimate medical purpose.”126
In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court invalidated the
Interpretive Rule and affirmed a permanent injunction granted by the
District Court of the District of Oregon against the Rule’s enforcement.127
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995) (pointing to the agency’s “latitude . . . in enforcing the
statute, together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary” for enforcement, as factors
counseling for deference); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (declining
to give deference because of inconsistencies in agency positions).
120
Many commentators have been critical of this uncertainty. See Sunstein, supra note 117, at 194
(arguing that that there are “much simpler and better ways” to achieve the Court’s goal); Adrian
Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 361 (2003) (“[T]he Court
has inadvertently sent the lower courts stumbling into a no-man’s land.”); accord Lisa Schulz Bressman,
How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1475 (2005).
121
546 U.S. 243 (2006).
122
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.995 (2009).
123
21 U.S.C. §§ 811–812 (2006).
124
21 C.F.R. § 1306.04a (2010).
125
See Dispensing of Controlled Substances To Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607, 56,608 (Nov.
9, 2001).
126
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting the inclusion of an OLC opinion entitled “Whether
Physician-Assisted Suicide Serves a ‘Legitimate Medical Purpose’ Under the Drug Enforcement
Administration’s Regulations Implementing the Controlled Substances Act” (June 27, 2001)).
127
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 254, 275 (2006).
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Rejecting both the Attorney General’s larger claim of interpretive authority
and his specific reading of the CSA, the Court characterized the Ashcroft
Rule as an effort to transform an “obscure grant of [statutory] authority”
into a “radical shift of authority.”128 To reach this conclusion, the Court
drew on two lines of reasoning: a federalism argument and an institution
matching logic.129 On the federalism side, Justice Kennedy emphasized
provisions of the CSA that preserved state law from preemptive effect, and
provisions that appeared to assume the existence of robust and independent
state regulation of medical practice.130 Given this statutory context, the
Court discerned “no intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally” in
the statute.131
Before applying the federalism canon, though, Justice Kennedy had
already concluded that Ashcroft’s interpretation of the CSA received no
deference at Chevron step zero. This is where institution matching entered
the case. The Court reasoned that the Attorney General’s statutory authority
over the “registration and control” of controlled substances did not allow
promulgation of the Interpretive Rule.132 But, as Justice Scalia argued in
dissent, this conclusion could not be inferred from the text of the CSA,
which spoke in broad terms of the Attorney General’s power to register or
delist physicians based on the “public interest,” a criterion that Congress
had defined explicitly to include “public health and safety.”133 Surely this
broad mandate, reasoned Justice Scalia, encompassed the power to decide
that physician-assisted suicide was not a legitimate form of medical
practice.134 The government, in Justice Scalia’s eyes, had not only made the
necessary showing to satisfy Chevron step zero, it had found sufficient
ambiguity in the statute to secure full-bore Chevron deference to its
construction of the CSA.135
128

Id. at 274–75.
I bracket here the Court’s discussion of Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462–63 (1997), which
held that agency constructions of the agency’s own ambiguous regulations receive substantial deference.
But see Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 255–58 (explaining that the Ashcroft Rule “just repeats” or
“paraphrase[s]” the statutory text, and therefore did not constitute a clarification of the rule meriting
respect).
130
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 270–71 (“The structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a
functioning medical profession regulated under the States’ police powers.”).
131
Id. at 270. For commentary emphasizing this strand of Gonzales v. Oregon analysis, see Scott A.
Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy from Federal Administrative Encroachment, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 45, 64–66 (2008). Professor Bressman, by contrast, focuses on the promotion of political
accountability as the value being promoted in the decision. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and
Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 764 (2007) (“In Gonzales, the administration had used the
CSA to take a position on an issue that the people actively were debating, without involving or
ascertaining the views of the public.”).
132
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 259, 268 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 821 (2006)).
133
Id. at 282–84 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2006).
134
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 288–99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135
Id.
129
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Given the force of Justice Scalia’s analysis and the relative clarity of
the statute, Justice Kennedy could hardly rest his Chevron step zero
analysis on textual foundations. Instead, he employed an argument that
turned on the mismatch between the liberty interests impinged upon by the
Ashcroft Rule and the absence of Attorney General responsibility for the
governmental justifications for that intrusion.136
Two liberty-related concerns suffused the case. First, nearly a decade
earlier, the Court had rejected the argument that the Due Process Clause
protected an interest in “ending one’s life with a physician’s assistance.”137
And yet in Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court began its opinion by
underscoring the “importance of the issue of physician-assisted suicide” in
terms of the deeply personal nature of end-of-life decisions.138 The Court
thereby suggested that the fact courts did not directly enforce a liberty
interest in end-of-life decisions did not entail the further conclusion that
there was no liberty interest implicated by the Ashcroft decision salient to
the task of statutory interpretation. Even though the Court previously had
been unwilling to defend a liberty interest directly, in Gonzales v. Oregon
the Court suggested it would account for that interest in the Chevron step
zero analysis.139 And given that liberty interest, the Attorney General’s
sweeping claim of authority was “suspect.”140 Second, the Court observed
that accepting an Attorney General power to define legitimate medical
practice would mean endowing that official with an “extraordinary
authority . . . to criminalize even the actions of registered physicians” based
upon such official’s subjective judgments about medical science and
ethics.141 Clearly, this too implicated due process interests in the
predictability and stability of criminal liability-producing conduct.
The text of the statute, to be sure, could be read to encompass the
power to squelch both these liberty interests. But the Court demurred to this
broad reading by reasoning that the Attorney General was simply not
competent to exercise the kind of medical judgment necessary to make such
determinations.142 At the federal level, it was the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, not the Attorney General, who had the necessary expertise

136

See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267–68.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 n.24 (1997).
138
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 249, 267 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735).
139
One way to explain this is by seeing the due process value addressed in Glucksberg as
“underenforced” for institutional competence reasons. See Sager, supra note 53, at 1213. Although the
Court will not transform the liberty interest into full-bore doctrine, it will more gently promote it through
statutory interpretation. The same argument could be made in Hampton, where the Court understood
itself to be defending a “liberty interest [in] . . . eligibility for [federal] employment.” Letter from Justice
John Paul Stevens to Justice Potter Stewart, supra note 71, at 2.
140
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267–69.
141
Id. at 262.
142
Id. at 264–65.
137
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to make to those judgments in a careful and informed fashion.143 The
Attorney General’s reliance on Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) support for
his position was thus unavailing. The absence of competence on medical
matters defeated the Attorney General’s claim that liberty was being
narrowed for legitimate reasons. Correlatively, had the Secretary instituted
the same policy, the Court may well not have invalidated it.
This is Gonzales v. Oregon as an exercise in institution matching.
Given the difficulty of determining when the Government was justified in
expansively criminalizing medical practice or shutting down debate on
assisted suicide, the Court opted to look at the institutional locus of the
relevant decision. It focused less on the quality of the reasons supplied by
the Government and more on the kind of actor engaged in the decision. It
used the CSA’s text to distinguish sharply between delegations to law
enforcement officials and delegations to technocratic medical professionals.
Without this institution matching argument, the Court could easily have
followed Justice Scalia’s lead in reading the CSA to vest broad discretion in
the Attorney General and ending its analysis there.
Gonzales v. Oregon is a case in which rights-related concerns impinge
on the calculus of delegated statutory authority. But it is not the only case in
which the Court has looked askance at agency action out of a concern that
putatively technocratic decisions were driven by improper concerns. A year
after confronting the Ashcroft Rule, the Court addressed whether the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had jurisdiction to regulate
vehicular greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act.144 In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court rejected the EPA’s appeal for Chevron
deference and its underlying conclusion on the merits that it lacked
statutory authority to act against global warming.145 This conclusion,
reasoned the Court with Justice Stevens writing, contradicted the “clear
statutory command.”146 As in Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court explained that
the agency’s “laundry list” of reasons for not regulating had “nothing to do
with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change” and
“[s]till less” amounted to “a reasoned justification for declining to form a
scientific judgment.”147 The uncoupling of agency expertise from a
regulatory decision with high stakes for public health and welfare (if not
constitutional rights) raised red flags for the Court. As in Gonzales v.
143

Id. at 274 (“[T]he Attorney General is an unlikely recipient of such broad authority, given the
Secretary’s primacy in shaping medical policy under the CSA, and the statute’s otherwise careful
allocation of decisionmaking powers.”); see also Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping
Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 247 (“Ultimately, what drove the Court’s
analysis [in Gonzales] was the relationship between statutes that share jurisdiction among the various
federal and state authorities . . . .”).
144
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511 (2007).
145
Id. at 532–35.
146
Id. at 533.
147
Id. at 533–34.
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Oregon, the Justices consequently declined to apply the traditional canons
of deference to “executive positions that they found untrustworthy, in the
sense that executive expertise had been subordinated to politics.”148 By
sending the agency back to the drawing board in both cases, the Court
aimed to induce decisions grounded not on politics but on reasoned
expertise.149 What distinguishes the cases is the different reasons why the
Court viewed the agency decision with a gimlet eye.150 In the assistedsuicide case, the wrong element of the government made the decision. In
the climate-change case, the right entity acted, but for the wrong kind of
reasons. In both cases, the Court’s decision thus turned on the perceived
quality of the Executive’s decisionmaking (rather than, say, the quality of
congressional deliberation on a matter). But the Court used different proxies
to conclude that the Executive’s reasoning was flawed in the two cases.
C. Institution Matching in National Security Law
A third example of institution matching can be drawn from case law
generated by challenges to federal responses to the September 11, 2001
terrorism attacks.151 In post-9/11 jurisprudence, the Court has reacted to
aggressive policy innovation in a variety of ways, with postures ranging
from sharp skepticism to broad deference. These judicial responses cannot
easily be explained by a national security-specific dynamic. Some scholars,
for example, have argued that the cases turn on a separation of powers
logic, with the Court endorsing policies only when both Congress and the
Executive support such policies.152 But the precedent poorly corresponds to
this theory, with some executive initiatives being authorized and some
bilaterally endorsed policies being struck down.153 Rather, national security
law is importantly continuous with other areas of law. Relevant here, one
commonality between the post-9/11 national security jurisprudence and
148

Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP.
CT. REV. 51, 52.
149
Id. at 99–101.
150
Note that politics does not always take second place to expertise. The Court will alternatively
read a statute to exclude a delegation to an agency in cases where the Court believes the determination is
better suited to resolution by elected officials. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (“In extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate before concluding
that Congress has intended . . . an implicit delegation [to an agency].”); cf. Bressman, supra note 131, at
765–67 (emphasizing the virtue of limiting agency action in circumstances of immanent congressional
opposition).
151
See Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 225–26
(sketching problems generated by novel security policy responses).
152
See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 1, 5 (2004) (“[C]ourts have developed a process-based, institutionally-oriented (as opposed to rightsoriented) framework for examining the legality of governmental action in extreme security contexts.”).
153
Huq, supra note 151, at 254–56 (discussing such precedent, including Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009), and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)).
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other domains of law is the institution matching canon, which may provide
the best account of why the Court has invalidated some innovative security
policies and upheld others.
Consider two opinions in which the Court has turned aside important,
innovative post-9/11 government policies. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the
Court invalidated a system of military commissions established by
presidential directive in November 2001.154 Justice Stevens’s majority
opinion focused on the statutory, rather than constitutional, terrain of
whether the President’s November 2001 order complied with the
congressional delegation of authority to convene military commissions
contained in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).155 The Court’s
analysis turned on Article 36(b) of the UCMJ, which demanded that
military commission and court-martial procedures “be uniform insofar as
practicable.”156 Even though President Bush had made a determination
under a separate UCMJ provision that it was impracticable to apply the
criminal procedure rules used in Article III courts, the Court found that the
military commissions’ divergences from court-martial procedures—for
example, commission rules allowing for the admission of certain kinds of
hearsay and the periodic exclusion of the defendant—failed Article 36(b)’s
uniformity command.157 The Court therefore invalidated the commissions as
outside the President’s authority.
Hamdan is typically cataloged as a separation of powers decision in
which the Court policed the outer boundaries of a congressional
authorization.158 But this account is incomplete. It fails to explain why the
Court did not defer to the President’s determination that such uniformity
was impractical under the circumstances.159 As Justice Thomas forcefully
argued in dissent, the text of Article 36(b) could be read as a broad grant of
discretion to the President and not as a limitation on his authority.160 In the
context of military affairs, moreover, it might be thought that an especially
154

548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006) (citing Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001)).
155
Justice Stevens also concluded that the November 2001 order impermissibly envisaged the
charging of offenses that were not cognizable under the law of war, but this portion of his opinion did
not obtain the support of a majority of the Court. Id. at 595–613 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
156
Id. at 620 (opinion of the Court) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2006)).
157
Id. at 614–25.
158
See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Separation of Powers
After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 953–55, 956–63 (2007).
159
See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1170, 1224 (2007) (setting forth argument in favor of deference). The Court’s reasoning here was
confused. It first stated that it owed “complete deference” to the President’s determination. Hamdan,
548 U.S. at 623. It then observed that President Bush had made no formal finding of impracticality
under Article 36(b) of the UCMJ but rejected the possibility that this would be outcome determinative.
Id. It then went on to look at the evidence of impracticability—an inquiry that is inconsistent with
deference to the President’s determination. Id. at 624.
160
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 711–15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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powerful kind of “Chevron plus” deference would extend to presidential
readings of ambiguous federal statutes.161 Compounding the case for
deference, Hamdan involved a geographic jurisdiction—Guantánamo—to
which the Court had not clearly extended individual constitutional
entitlements.162 As in Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court was dealing with
circumstances in which it was not at all clear in the light of then-prevailing
precedent that there were any individual entitlements that could be
judicially enforced.163 Separation of powers explanations for the result in
Hamdan simply fail to explain the Court’s refusal to defer to the President’s
reading of the law.
At first blush, Hamdan seems an unpromising exemplar of institution
matching. The November 2001 military commission order was, after all, a
product of the White House, signed by the Commander in Chief. What
more appropriate institutional actor could there be? Indeed, viewed in this
light, Hamdan is a remarkable case. It is a case in which the Court set aside
a military policy determination reached at the highest level of government,
by an actor with a constitutionally committed function in respect to military
matters, in the absence of a pellucidly clear statutory direction to the
contrary. What demands explanation in Hamdan is the Court’s surprising
decision not to accord with the President’s impracticability determination
some kind of outcome-determinative deference.
Institution matching here provides an explanation of the Court’s
action—but only if it is tweaked so as to be employed differently from its
applications in the criminal law and administrative law domains. To see
this, notice first that the November 2001 military commission order was a
product of the White House, and not the Pentagon. Indeed, to the extent that
the Defense Department supplied justifications for the military
commissions’ procedural shortcuts, these explanations might be criticized
in retrospect as post hoc, superficial, and unconvincing. That is, the Court
may have looked at the President’s order on its face and expressly found it
to be the product of an institution informed not by “the purpose and the
history of military commissions.”164 When the Court examined the
161

See, e.g., Curtis v. Peters, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding, in the course of a
Chevron analysis, that “the actions of the Air Force are entitled to even greater deference than are other
agency actions”).
162
Posner and Sunstein explain the result in Hamdan by “a distinctive kind of nondelegation
canon—one that requires Congress to speak clearly if it seeks to allow the executive to depart from the
usual methods for conducting criminal trials.” Posner & Sunstein, supra note 159, at 1224. But this is
question-begging. Why was not Article 36(b) a sufficient authorization for such departure for
circumstances in which Article III courts were not necessarily available? Congress did speak with some
clarity to the question of when military commissions could be used. Something more is needed to
explain the result in Hamdan—such as the logic of institution matching.
163
See Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2007–
2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 23–25 (2008).
164
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 624.
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presidential order it failed to locate the requisite indicia of expertise. Instead
it saw the product of political deliberation not versed in military law.165 The
Court thus ignored the formalist indicia of expertise (such as the text of
Article II of the Constitution), and engaged in a functionalist analysis of
how the institution that promulgated the military commission policy
developed its position.166
There is indirect evidence that it was the felt absence of military
expertise in the November 2001 order that made the Court look askance at
President Bush’s military commissions, notwithstanding the President’s
constitutionally committed role as Commander in Chief. The substantive
portion of Justice Stevens’s Hamdan opinion is replete with references to
the traditional content of military law as exemplified by William
Winthrop’s landmark treatise.167 Winthrop, who the Court had previously
recognized as the “Blackstone of Military Law,”168 provided the Hamdan
Court with a compass to ascertain the contours and demands of military
exigency as defined by tradition-ratified military expertise.169 Absent
evidence that the nonmilitary decisionmaker had relied on military law and
expertise in determining when to abrogate from a defendant’s procedural
entitlements in criminal adjudication, the Hamdan Court declined to defer
even to the President. Hamdan thus employs the institution matching canon,
but in a way that rests on a more searching and substantive judgment about
the question of expertise leveraged by the relevant component of
government.170 In this fashion, it approaches the methodology of
Massachusetts v. EPA, but still partakes of the component-specific
judgment about executive process that informed Gonzales v. Oregon.171 In
short, Hamdan is an example of institution matching infused with a heavy
165

Subsequent accounts of the November 2001 order’s creation, although not available to the
Hamdan Court, confirmed that relative absence of military law expertise in the crafting of the
commission system. See Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, A Different Understanding With the President,
WASH. POST, June 24, 2007, at A1.
166
This, however, is consistent with the understanding of Hampton offered by Justice Stevens to
other Justices in his memos about the case. See supra text accompanying note 72.
167
See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590–92 (citing WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS 831–32 (2d ed. 1920)).
168
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, THE BLACKSTONE OF MILITARY LAW: COLONEL WILLIAM
WINTHROP (2009).
169
See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590, 592 n.21, 595, 597–600, 604–05, 607, 624–25; see also
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) (also citing Winthrop).
170
Note a troubling feature of this logic: It flips the traditional understanding of civilian control of
the military by making some civilian decisions contingent on the backing of military experts.
171
What if the Bush Administration had attempted to integrate military expertise more explicitly
and conscientiously into the crafting of military commission policy, and then presented evidence to that
effect to the Supreme Court? Notwithstanding the fact that by 2006 the White House was losing political
credibility fast, I suspect (but of course cannot prove) this may have had an outcome-dispositive effect
on the Hamdan litigation.
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dose of situation-specific political realism about the particular components
of government in question.
The second example of institution matching from the national security
context is the Court’s decision to grant a petition for certiorari from the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 decision to extinguish habeas
jurisdiction for detainees held at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base.172 The
ensuing opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, as is well-known, turns on the
Suspension Clause of Article I of the Constitution.173 Because it rests
directly on the interpretation of a constitutional provision, Boumediene
seems an unlikely place to identify the logic of institution matching at work.
That canon, after all, operates only in the shadow of direct constitutional
enforcement. Institution matching, however, enters the picture in the
context of the Court’s decision to accept the petition for certiorari from the
detainees—a “decision to decide” almost as consequential as the result of
the case itself.174 Initially, the Court declined to hear Boumediene, but three
months later reversed course and accepted the case for review on the last
day of the 2006 Term upon a petition for rehearing.175 Petitions for
rehearing, however, are rarely successful before the Supreme Court.176
Hence, the Boumediene decision rests on a threshold puzzle: Why, perhaps
having decided that the stakes of the case were too fraught or
constitutionally salient liberty interests not sufficiently imperiled, did the
Court decide to hear the case?
Institution matching again provides an answer. As it arrived at the
Court, the Boumediene case presented the question of how the courts should
review individual detention determinations by military bodies called
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs),177 described in Chief Justice
Roberts’s dissent as “the most generous set of procedural protections ever
afforded aliens detained by this country as enemy combatants.”178 The
Court’s initial decision to deny certiorari reflects the deference traditionally
accorded military decisionmaking, even in cases implicating individual
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Boumediene v. Bush, 551 U.S. 1160 (2007) (granting certiorari).
553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
174
On the importance of the threshold decision as to which cases to hear, see H.W. PERRY, JR.,
DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1–21 (1991).
175
Compare 550 U.S. 1328, 1328–29 (2007) (denying petition for certiorari), with 551 U.S. at 1160
(2007) (granting petition for certiorari).
176
See EUGENE GRESSMAN, KENNETH S. GELLER, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, TIMOTHY S. BISHOP &
EDWARD A. HARTNETT, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 804 (9th ed. 2007) (“A petition for
rehearing . . . will not be granted except by a majority of the Court.” (quoting SUP. CT. R. 44) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Prior to Boumediene, the Court had last granted such a petition in 1956. See
Reid v. Covert, 352 U.S. 901, 901 (1956) (granting petition for certiorari).
177
553 U.S. at 733–34 (describing Defense Department establishment of CSRTs).
178
Id. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
173
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rights.179 What may have nudged the Court to change course was a
perception that the CSRTs were not, in fact, exercises in military
decisionmaking, and that the narrowing of procedural entitlements that the
Boumediene petitioners protested was not underwritten by relevant securityrelated expertise.
The Court’s “lack of faith in CSRTs”180 may plausibly be traced to a
declaration from a senior military lawyer, lodged alongside the petition for
rehearing of the denial of certiorari, which suggested the CSRTs were
organized to affirm detention decisions but not to yield accurate results.181
The Court could have reasoned that it was not confronted by an institutional
apparatus designed to generate and apply expertise carefully to calibrate
deprivations of liberty precisely.182 The taint of suspicion also leaks into the
merits of the Boumediene decision, in which the Court underscored the
“myriad deficiencies in the CSRTs” as a justification for holding that robust
district court factfinding was a necessary supplement to any military
process accorded to the Guantánamo detainees.183
Neither Hamdan nor Boumediene precisely tracks the logic of
Hampton. In both post-9/11 cases, the Executive might have made a
plausible case that the component of government charged with a decision
(the White House and CSRTs respectively) had the relevant and necessary
expertise to decide whether restraints on liberty were in fact justified by
pressing policy concerns. Unlike Hampton, these cases do not turn on the
formal characteristics and legal mandate of the relevant governmental
component. Rather, in both cases, extra-record evidence may have
suggested to the Court that any expertise putatively held by the
governmental component had either been distorted or wholly withheld. No
match existed as a result between the institution and the security-policy
justifications offered for liberty deprivations. Viewed in this light,
Boumediene and Hamdan exemplify a functionalist rather than a formalist
methodology of institution matching. They further suggest that the Court
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See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509–10 (1986) (denying free exercise claim
challenging military dress regulations).
180
Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantánamo: The Boumediene Decision,
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 43.
181
See Reply to Opposition to Petition for Rehearing at i–viii, Al Odah v. United States, 551 U.S.
1161 (2007) (No. 06-1196) (declaration of Stephen Abraham, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve);
see also Meltzer, supra note 180, at 47–48 (describing declaration); William Glaberson, In Shift,
Justices Agree to Review Detainees’ Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at A1 (drawing the same
inference).
182
Accord Meltzer, supra note 180, at 49 (“One interpretation of the Boumediene decision is that
the Court simply lacked faith that military officials serving on CSRTs possessed the combination of
capacity and will needed to make judgments that struck reasonable accommodations between the
contending interests at play.”).
183
553 U.S. at 783. To be precise, the Court here was paraphrasing the petitioners’ argument; it
went on to accept the basic force of that argument. Id. at 785–87.
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can demonstrate sensitivity to the occasional availability of particularized
information about how government in fact operates.184 They suggest that
information about the actual exercise of expertise can trump formalist
considerations grounded in constitutional or statutory text about how such
expertise ought, by law, to be cultivated and exercised. And they show how
the method by which a canon is operationalized can subtly change over time
even as the basic strategy of the Justices persists.
The logic and the results in Hamdan and Boumediene contrast
strikingly with another sequence of post-9/11 cases in which the Court has
exercised more circumspection and deference to political branch decisions
respecting national security. In this other line of cases, the Court has
suggested that security decisions obtain respect when rendered by a
properly qualified body and in the absence of disqualifying exogenous
data.185 The first two cases arose in 2008. In Winter v. NRDC, the Court
vacated a preliminary injunction against the Navy’s use of mid-frequency
active sonar in training exercises off the southern Californian coast.186
Drawing an extensive picture of the Navy’s efforts to predict risks to
aquatic megafauna using sophisticated computer modeling technologies,
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion relied on the “complex, subtle, and
professional decisions” underpinning the Navy’s policy to vacate the
injunction.187 In Munaf v. Geren, the Court unanimously denied habeas
relief to a pair of U.S. citizens detained in Iraq by American forces on the
ground that the Executive Branch was better equipped to make decisions
about when to cooperate, and when not to cooperate, with an ally in the
course of ongoing military operations.188 The Court emphasized the State
Department’s examination of conditions in Iraqi prisons, thus matching the
liberty deprivation at issue in that case to the putative exercise of
institutional expertise by an appropriate component of the federal
government.189
Finally, in the 2010 case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
(HLP), the Court turned aside First Amendment objections to one of several
statutes that criminalize diverse forms of “material support” to terrorism.190
184

Such information may only rarely be available. Cf. Judith Resnick, Detention, The War on
Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 618 (2010) (“The Guantánamo cases are thus
rare instances when participants—prosecutors and lower tier decisionmakers within the CSRT process—
broke ranks to report failures in their own work.”).
185
See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674
(2008).
186
555 U.S. at 12–13.
187
Id. at 24, 33 (emphasis added) (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
188
553 U.S. at 700–01. Full disclosure: I was counsel for the habeas petitioners in this litigation.
189
Id. at 702.
190
130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724–30 (2010) (rejecting challenge to applications of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, one
of several material support provisions).
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This case turned upon whether “any contribution” to a foreign organization
designated as terrorist by the Secretary of State could have the effect of
promoting terrorism, even if the contribution could not be employed
directly to promote or support violence.191 To conclude that even innocuous
aid could promote terrorism by freeing up an organization’s resources and
legitimating its goals, the Court relied on a State Department affidavit
purporting to embody the “experience and analysis of the U.S. government
agencies charged with combating terrorism.”192 Inverting the usually
heightened judicial sensitivity to factual questions in the First Amendment
context,193 the Court leaned instead on its “respect” for the predictive
judgment of expert officials as justification for its refusal to engage in
anything more than minimal scrutiny of either the government’s fungibility
or legitimacy argument.194 The result in HLP was a peculiar combination of
notionally strict First Amendment scrutiny195 and self-consciously
deferential judicial inattention to the fit between a speech restriction and the
policy justifications offered to support that narrowing.196 In lieu of tailored
empirical analysis, the HLP Court effectively invoked the institution
matching canon in favor of the government: because the correct component
of the government made the relevant decision (here the State
Department197), the Court’s logic suggested that no further judicial inquiry
was needed.198
191

Id. at 2724–26.
Id. at 2727 (quoting Declaration of Kenneth R. McKune, Assoc. Coordinator for
Counterterrorism in the U.S. Dep’t of State, Joint Appendix at 133, HLP, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (Nos. 081498, 09-89), 2009 WL 3877534, at *133.).
193
See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984).
194
HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2727.
195
Id. at 2723–24 (rejecting the government’s argument that the statute should only “receive
intermediate scrutiny” and concluding that a “more rigorous scrutiny” was appropriate).
196
Id. at 2727 (“[W]hen it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in [the
national security] area, ‘the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked,’ and respect for the
Government’s conclusions is appropriate.” (citation omitted) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57,
65 (1981))).
197
The State Department is tasked by statute with designating “foreign terrorist organizations,”
which cannot be supported without violating the criminal law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1), (d)(4). Under
this statute, the State Department is tasked with determining that an entity is foreign, that it engages in
“terrorist activity” or “terrorism,” and thereby “threatens the security of United States nationals or the
national security of the United States.” Id. Under these circumstances, the Court seems to presume the
State Department has special competence respecting the facts underlying a designation.
198
The deference accorded governmental speech restrictions in HLP contrasts with the careful, factbound review employed by the Court (again with Chief Justice Roberts writing) in Snyder v. Phelps, 131
S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011). Contrasting HLP with Snyder suggests that the specificity of judicial review of
facts in First Amendment cases involving the application of strict scrutiny occupies a spectrum. Courts
dial deference up or down depending on the government’s justification for a decision. Whether it makes
sense to maximize deference in national security cases given the historical record of American civil
liberties during wartime is a question beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. GEOFFREY R. STONE,
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON
192
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National security is a domain in which factual determinations often
appear to be particularly resistant to judicial scrutiny. Such determinations
can rest on some combination of classified material and impossible-toquantify predictive judgment. It should thus be no surprise that the Court’s
entanglements with diverse post-9/11 issues furnish evidence of the
institution matching canon’s use both in favor of the government and in
favor of litigants challenging government action.
D. Summary: Institution Matching After Hampton
This Part has identified three diverse and otherwise unrelated domains
in which legal doctrine rests upon an institution matching logic—criminal
law, administrative law, and the post-9/11 jurisprudence of national
security. In none of these domains is the underlying liberty interest
absolute.199 The government can surely sometimes extinguish freedom from
criminal detention, the freedom to take one’s own life, and the freedom
from military detention. Standing alone, the liberty interests at stake in
some of these cases would not merit judicial protection. But by paying
attention to which component within a given branch is responsible for a
decision, the Court places a subtle finger on the scale in favor of a liberty or
equality interest. The Court ensures that the fit between that an interest’s
contraction and the justification for such narrowing is reasonably tight
without the epistemic heavy lifting that direct inquiry into the government’s
reasoning may require.
This evidence of institution matching’s persistence from diverse areas
of the law suggests that Hampton is not a dead letter and that the standard
account reprised in Part II is incorrect. Consciously or not, the Court across
the years has pursued Justice Stevens’s doctrinal insight in different guises.
The logic of institution matching accordingly warrants more scholarly
attention than the relative disregard it has to date received.
IV. EVALUATING THE INSTITUTION MATCHING CANON
Courts have developed a spectrum of doctrinal tests to implement the
Constitution’s abstract generalities across diverse policy contests and
shifting technological and social conditions. Should the institution matching
canon figure more prominently in that work, whether in its formalist or its
functional guise? This Part addresses that question by analyzing institution
matching in federal law.200

TERRORISM 530–50 (2004) (summarizing lessons from a study of wartime security panics since the early
Republic).
199
I assume the same analysis would apply to equality interests.
200
I focus on its application to Executive Branch decisions and bracket questions related to the
canon’s application to state institutions.
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At the outset, I should underscore again the limited ambition of the
following prescriptive analysis. My limited goal here is to specify, I hope
with some degree of precision, the costs and benefits of using institution
matching as an instrument of constitutional analysis and a part of the
federal judge’s toolkit. How the reader weighs those costs and benefits will
depend on her normative priors about the appropriate distribution of
interpretative authority on constitutional matters between courts and the
political branches. There obtains wide disagreement on the latter question. I
make no claim here to settle that disagreement. Given the existence of
profound normative disagreements on basic questions about what federal
courts can and should do in respect to constitutional enforcement, I believe
instead that the most useful approach for an analyst of a specific doctrinal
tool is to describe accurately and comprehensively how that instrument is
used and what its effects will be so that readers can reach their own
judgments. That is what I have aimed to do, however poorly and
incompletely, in this Part.
To clarify the canon’s costs and benefits, I develop two analytic
perspectives: a static and a dynamic one.201 The static analysis treats
institution matching as a discrete judicial intervention and then investigates
its positive and negative consequences. The dynamic perspective widens
the time horizon of analysis. It considers the potential for sequential
interactions among the multiple participants in the federal political system
(Congress, the Executive, and the courts), all of whom might exercise
rational foresight to anticipate the responses of other political interactions.202
The dynamic perspective thereby accounts for the possibility that “political
environments . . . impose systematic constraints” on embedded actors.203 It
also forces attention to potential policy effects that are only visible with the
passage of time, such as positive feedback loops and the gradual
entrenchment of institutional design decisions against amendment.204 I

201

Cf. Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National Climate
Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 250 (2010) (drawing a distinction between the two
kinds of analysis).
202
See, e.g., KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND
INSTITUTIONS 159–70 (2d ed. 2010) (introducing concepts of rational foresight and strategic
anticipation); Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Tonja Jacobi & Barry R. Weingast, The New Separation-ofPowers Approach to American Politics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 199
(Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman eds., 2006) (exploring spatial models of interbranch
interactions); cf. JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 327–29 (2007) (explaining the utility of dynamic modes of analysis); DAVID M. KREPS,
GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING 41–44 (1990) (same).
203
de Figueiredo, Jr. et al., supra note 202, at 200. For example, Congress anticipates the possibility
of presidential vetoes and legislates strategically to mitigate the risk. SHEPSLE, supra note 202, at 167–
69.
204
See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 44–48
(2004) (explaining the effects of sequencing and inertia on political institution design).
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consider seriatim costs and benefits in both a static and a dynamic
perspective.
Both static and dynamic modes of analysis must attend to the
possibility of the different ways in which courts might implement the
institution matching canon. In particular, courts might use a formalist
analysis of the kind used in Hampton, which turns solely on the statutory
mandate and similar formal characteristics of the agency. Alternatively,
courts could deploy the more functionalist analysis of Hamdan and
Boumediene, looking beyond categorical labels to determine whether an
administrative decision represents the application of actual expertise. The
choice between formalist and functionalist implementation of the canon
may influence both its pros and cons under either a static or dynamic
analysis.
A. Static Analysis of Institution Matching
Institution matching is designed to promote liberty and equality
interests by lowering the epistemic burden of judicial review—substituting
easy questions for hard ones—thereby expanding the range of constitutional
concerns plausibly vindicated by the bench. While there is some evidence
that the canon can successfully achieve those ends, there is also some
evidence of attendant costs.
From Hampton205 onward, judges have used institution matching as a
low-cost heuristic for ascertaining whether the narrowing of liberty or
equality interests is truly warranted.206 To this end, the canon relies on the
reasonably plausible assumption that agencies, or other components of
government, attend to their primary policy mission, but often are inattentive
to other nonmarquee concerns.207 Given that situation, it is cheaper for
courts to focus on, say, the statutory competences of the CSC or the
Attorney General than to wade into the murky waters of whether federal
employment decisions can figure in national security policy or to resolve
definitively the medical ethics of assisted suicide.
Notice, however, that the gain from this epistemic substitution is offset
as courts move from the parsimonious formalist version of the canon
employed in Gonzales v. Oregon to the empirically more latitudinarian
functionalist version used in Hamdan. The functionalist iteration of
institution matching therefore might be better justified on the basis of
205

Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 115–16 (1976).
See supra Part III (supplying evidence for this claim).
207
J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2220
(2005) (“Agencies frequently resolve . . . conflicts by prioritizing their primary mission and letting their
secondary obligations fall by the wayside.”); see also Eric Biber, Too Many Things To Do: How To
Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9–13 (2009)
(explaining that agencies burdened with multiple tasks tend to focus on measurable objectives and goals
that are consistent with the internal culture’s priorities).
206
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somewhat different assumptions. It allows courts to take account of the
pervasive uncertainty about both constitutional rules and the effects of
policies on the ground by use of “a kind of implicit balancing of
interests.”208 In this way, the functionalist version of institution matching
enables judges to engage in a probabilistic weighing of the best available
evidence for whether a liberty or equality interest has been needlessly
narrowed. It also permits judges to calibrate their responses more finely. In
cases such as Hamdan and Boumediene, for example, where exogenous
information suggested that government justificatory claims should be
discounted, the functional version of institution matching provided a
vehicle for the expression of judicial skepticism without the strong
medicine of irredeemable invalidation. The functionalist variant may be
especially attractive in national security cases, where evidentiary barriers
are especially high and the political costs of direct enforcement potentially
prohibitive.209 In these circumstances, it is especially plausible to think that
judicial inquiry into whether an agency has exercised expertise at all is less
costly than judicial inquiry into whether the agency has exercised expertise
correctly. Moreover, it mitigates the risk of the Executive employing
formal, legal mandates as cover for rights-infringing actions.
Both functionalist and formalist versions of institution matching force
recourse to more tailored institutional vehicles. Decisions about medical
matters must go through the Secretary of Health and Human Services, for
example, while decisions with diplomatic repercussions must be handled by
the Secretary of State. All else being equal, the judicial demand for such
specificity via the institution matching canon imposes a costly friction upon
rulemaking efforts.210 The channeling effect of institution matching reduces
the range of available institutional avenues for implementing a policy that
will survive judicial challenge. It thus has a deregulatory edge because
political actors have less leeway to distribute labor between government
components in ways that account for the changing workload of government.
This narrowing of institutional design options increases the risk of
bottlenecks. To the extent that the agencies with expertise are independent
of presidential control, the use of institution matching may also result in
policy differences between the White House and agency heads delaying or
even precluding rules’ promulgation.

208

Stephenson, supra note 51, at 5.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), is a notorious example of how direct
enforcement of a constitutional norm can fail when political actors leverage federal courts’ epistemic
and political constraints. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties
in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273, 294. That Korematsu has become an aversive precedent in the
constitutional law canon is no recompense for those harmed by the policy it endorsed.
210
See Stephenson, supra note 51, at 11 (“[J]udicial doctrines can raise the costs to legislators of
enacting a given policy . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
209
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Hence, both direct and indirect forms of institution matching operate as
a sort of “resistance norm” that increases the price of political action close
to the constitutional line without wholly precluding such action.211 By
placing the burden on the political branches to internalize higher enactment
costs in constitutionally troubling circumstances, the canon pushes political
actors to take constitutional values seriously. In this way, it resembles the
enactment-cost explanation for the avoidance canon. But the institution
matching canon also mitigates the potential perverse effect of enactmentcost mechanisms—that of ratifying precisely those measures where
legislative animus is greatest. By demanding a fit between administrative
actor and substantive decision, the institution matching canon does not
merely reward raw political effort. It rewards effort of the right kind—i.e.,
effort supported by expertise. In a similar vein, the canon may also amplify
democratic accountability by making it easier for the public to ascribe
responsibility for particular decisions to particular governmental
components.212
If institution matching reduces the cost of judicial review, it means
courts can vindicate a broader range of constitutional values that otherwise
would go underenforced. The evidence of the canon’s success on this metric
is somewhat mixed. Hampton yielded to reinstallation of an animus-based
policy.213 But Gonzales v. Oregon has left in place the state’s Death with
Dignity Act.214 The Apprendi principle’s effect remains controversial given
the unusual remedial solution of Booker.215 But Hamdan precipitated two
major legislative enactments that revived military commissions, albeit with
more generous procedural protections.216 And Boumediene was followed by
a significant decrease in the number of releases from Guantánamo.217 Based
on this history is not clear that the use of institution matching has always
led to a net increase in the achievement of constitutional outcomes. Like

211

Young, supra note 51, at 1552.
Cf. Rosberg, supra note 12, at 280 (arguing that Hampton prevented “Congress and the President
[from] hid[ing] behind the Civil Service Commission”). Although common in constitutional reasoning,
claims about democratic accountability must be treated with care. They often rest on controversial, but
unstated, assumptions about how voters consume information and why they vote. Given these concerns,
the point in the text should be taken with appropriate caution.
213
See supra text accompanying notes 75–77.
214
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 275 (2006).
215
Cf. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion,
117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1482 (2008) (“[Booker] reduc[es] the leverage of federal prosecutors by recharging
the sentencing judge . . . .”).
216
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801–07, 123
Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).
217
Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 402–04 (2010).
212
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other substantive canons, therefore, institution matching appears “never [to
be] a complete solution” to the problem of constitutional enforcement.218
Yet this somewhat haphazard record may not be a conclusive strike
against the canon but rather evidence of the canon’s democratic merit.
There are many commentators who are suspicious of judicial review on
democratic or majoritarian grounds. For them, the institution matching
canon may be an attractive way for courts to promote constitutional values
without wholly “degenerat[ing]” into democracy-displacing direct
enforcement.219 The canon thus draws attention to potential constitutional
questions without taking matters wholly out of democratically accountable
hands. It may furthermore have the salutary effect of pushing decisions into
the hands of higher profile decisionmakers, whether directly elected
officials or the head of departments or agencies.220 The resulting
transparency and publicity further conduce to more “accountable and
considered decision making” and constitutionally inflected outcomes free of
countermajoritarian taint.221 That the canon in practice does not always
result in the supposedly constitutionally favored outcome is then evidence
that it is working with, and not against, the democratic process. Of course,
what some style as a benefit, others will condemn as needless constraints on
the judicial promotion of constitutional norms. Like other “weak” forms of
judicial review,222 institution matching can plausibly be condemned as
inadequate precisely because it allows political actors to revive
constitutionally problematic rules, as indeed occurred in Hampton and
perhaps Hamdan.
Moreover, if courts use the canon without regard to the probability of
political-branch reversal, there is the risk that institution matching can have
the “affirmatively perverse” effect of inducing political actors to reject
constitutional concerns about which they would otherwise have remained
ambiguous or uncertain.223 As in Hampton and Hamdan, a court’s
application of the canon can have the unintended consequence of inducing a
policy’s ratification by more powerful actors (e.g., Congress or the
President), thereby entrenching a dubious choice that judges had otherwise
sought to discourage. Even if the court can then invalidate the newly
enacted policy, its doing so may well demand more political capital than a
threshold invalidation would have done. Alternatively, it may be that the
218

Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 148, at 98–99.
Tushnet, supra note 9, at 2792.
220
In this regard, institution matching may be like the modification of Chevron proposed in David
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exercise of a weak form of judicial review will make an issue salient to
interest groups who otherwise would not have mobilized around an issue.224
For example, the Hampton decision may have lead to an increase in
publicity about and awareness of the question whether noncitizens should
be employed by the federal government. The result of more aggressive
interest group mobilization precipitated by the employment of institution
matching may be less, and not more, enforcement of a constitutional law. In
the long term, there is accordingly a risk that application of the institution
matching canon might (depending on the path of politics) lead to more and
not fewer violations of the Constitution.
On the other hand, opponents of judicial review will be concerned
about the opposite risk. The institution matching canon can be deployed
strategically even when judges know that reenactment of the measure is
unlikely given the current distribution of political forces.225 On this account,
it provides a mere façade to obscure the exercise of judicial fiat, a form of
direct constitutional enforcement for which courts do not take full
accountability. This may be especially troubling in cases such as Hampton
and Gonzales v. Oregon, where there is no precedent that supplies a reason
to think that an independently protected liberty or equality interest is at
stake. In such cases, institution matching seems to enable a “judge-made
penumbra” around constitutional rules that blocks political action that
should properly be permitted.226 Further, the canon vests judges with large
discretion about when and how to reject democratically selected outcomes.
It is by now well-established that judges’ votes are at least in part correlated
to their apparent substantive policy preferences.227 Judges wishing to infuse
decisions with their own policy preferences can play fast and loose in their
characterization of institutions, thereby shifting effective power from the
political branches to the federal courts, while at the same time introducing
costly new uncertainty into the legal regime.
The formalist and functionalist versions of institution matching present
this risk to different degrees. A formalist inquiry is both less costly and
224
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more predictable than a functionalist variant. The former may be vulnerable
to Executive Branch manipulation of mandates and labels, but the latter
creates a greater risk of courts reaching judgment based on freewheeling
assessments of the open-ended question whether an agency has in fact used
expertise. Using a functionalist rationale, courts could easily invoke
different, and plausibly conflicting, values as a basis for preferring one
agency over another. For example, it is possible that agencies’ decisions are
disproportionately influenced by private actors, such as regulated
industries.228 Arguably, a functionalist variant on institution matching
should not only account for distortions in executive branch reasoning due to
endogenous political influences, but also due to exogenous agency capture.
But to take on that role, courts would have to embark on the onerous, and
perhaps impossible, task of defining the appropriate level of private
influence on a given agency. In light of these complications, it is possible to
imagine that institution matching, rather than reducing the agency costs of
executive action, would instead become a new source of judicial agency
costs.229 At the very least, it would be a new source of uncertainty and
instability for agencies, which would have no reliable way to forecast
whether their actions would be deemed consistent with the canon.230
One final problem with institution matching warrants attention here.
The analytic force of that tool withers as the structure of the Executive
Branch becomes increasingly centralized. Recent political and legal trends
conduce to a vertical drift of decisional authority from agencies upward to
the White House. Faced with divided government, recent administrations
have shifted more effective authority into the President’s direct control,
which as a result has “expanded dramatically” since 1992.231 While courts
can still distinguish presidential decisions from those of expert agencies—
as the Court seems to have done in Hamdan232—this is more politically
costly and less analytically tractable than distinguishing between different
agencies. Claims that the White House already possesses a reserve of
substantive expertise muddy the analysis even further.233 Compounding
these political trends is the Supreme Court’s apparent return to the “unitary”
Executive as a ground of decision. In 2010, the Court invalidated provisions
228

See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1285 (2006) (“[E]xplanations [of agency capture] look to how agencies
cooperate with interest groups in order to procure needed information, political support, and guidance;
the more one-sided that information, support, and guidance, the more likely that agencies will act
favorably toward the dominant interest group.”); accord George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 12 (1971).
229
I am grateful to Jide Nzelibe for pressing this point in correspondence.
230
Ex ante uncertainty would be heightened if courts employed both formalist and functionalist
versions of the canon promiscuously.
231
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248 (2001).
232
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590 (2006).
233
Kagan, supra note 231, at 2352–53.

459

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

of the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act on the theory that the President lacked
“full control” of regulatory entities created by that statute.234 Perseverance
in this Article II logic may further push effective authority upward within
the Executive, concentrating power in the White House and rendering
institution matching less relevant. This dynamic may be especially
pronounced if there is no other agency empowered to take the decision in
question. Consider, for example, the facts in Hampton. Only the CSC
appeared to have the necessary breadth of authority to set personnel policy
for the federal government as a whole. Neither the Department of Defense
nor the National Security Council has any such authority. As a result, the
practical effect of the Hampton decision was to push the challenged
decision upward in the vertical hierarchy of the Executive Branch.
To reiterate, the net positive or negative effect of the considerations
canvassed here is likely a function of the analyst’s views about appropriate
levels of judicial review, the extent of current judicial underenforcement of
constitutional norms, and the agency costs attendant to judicial discretion.
Provisionally, and bracketing arguments for an absolute rejection of judicial
review for constitutional concerns, it might be thought that both skeptics
and supporters of judicial review would identify at least some
circumstances in which institution matching is warranted and more
desirable than the status quo judicial methodology. Each camp, however,
may wish to see the canon deployed under different circumstances and to
distinct ends.
B. Dynamic Analysis of Institution Matching
Judicial doctrine—the distillation and generalization of judges’
behavior across diverse cases—“shapes policy outcomes” because
Congress, the White House, and the agencies must all account for the
possibility that their decisions will be delayed, modified, or derailed by the
courts.235 As a consequence, it is likely that political actors will anticipate
courts’ responses to policy choices and modify their own decisions in light
of their predictions of what courts will do. But courts are also not final
movers in the production of policy outcomes. The institution matching
canon in particular almost invites political actors to take a second cut at a
policy problem using different instruments. As the aftermaths of Hampton
and Hamdan show, Congress and the Executive each hold in reserve some
authority to unspool judicial decisions.236 In consequence, judges must
234
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either be strategic actors themselves or resign themselves to irrelevance
even when constitutional concerns are at stake.237 Policy outcomes, in short,
must be understood as the products of strategic and iterative interactions of
multiple political actors through time. From this perspective, static analyses
must be complemented with a dynamic view of the canon’s effect in
political time. This dynamic perspective reveals new costs and benefits.
Attention to the institution matching canon in a dynamic perspective
suggests two potential sequences of play with very different outcomes—one
likely desirable and the other probably troubling. Consider first the
affirmative story. This turns on the possibility that the canon will induce
virtuous feedback mechanisms within agencies. As political scientists have
long recognized, bureaucracies are “adaptive” institutions that respond to
changing policy environments, including incremental and temporally
dispersed judicial action.238 A positive account of the dynamic effects of
institution matching would posit that agencies whose decisions are negated
on institution matching grounds find such reversals costly and
embarrassing. They therefore seek to avoid such reversals in the future by
acquiring both expertise on a matter and a congressional imprimatur upon
that expertise. Information and the expertise to use it are exogenous and
costly to acquire to begin with.239 Agencies do not engage in such
investments absent incentives to do so. Institution matching provides such
incentives,240 and may prompt agencies to seek out expertise proactively.241
Once garlanded with expertise, agencies have an incentive to protect their
turf by updating their information investments and by resisting political
interference.242
But this story may be too optimistic. Instead of positive adaption, the
political branches may respond strategically to the courts’ use of institution
matching in ways that dampen, mitigate, or circumvent the doctrine’s
purposes. There are three mechanisms through which such negative
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feedback loops might work. First, the political branches over time can try to
appoint judges less inclined to promote constitutional values. The
effectiveness of this response, of course, depends on the rate of turnover on
the bench. Increasing longevity over the past century perhaps makes it an
unreliable path.243 Second, political actors might choose obduracy as a
response to institution matching so as to pressure courts into abandoning the
tactic. That is, the political branches may respond to the institution
matching canon as they did in Hampton—by having a different institution
take the disputed decision without any meaningful supplemental gathering
of evidence or any change in the normative bases for a decision.244 Judicial
competence limitations may, as in the case of the alienage bar on federal
employment, leave the relevant constitutional rule underenforced.
Anticipating this sequence of events, rational judges would refrain from
using institution matching, which merely delays an inevitable settlement of
the law without tangible gains in constitutional compliance.245 On this
account, the aftermath of Hampton can be explained as a political branch
effort to dissuade the federal courts from meaningfully developing the
institution matching canon. The canon, in other words, may have a built-in
self-defeating logic246 in the absence of judicial mechanisms to counter
political branch manipulation.247
A third long-term response to the institution matching canon may be
congressional or presidential reorganization of the Executive Branch in
ways that shield decisions behind formally expertise-rich but functionally
ad hoc or empty institutional structures. Both Congress and the White
House exercise some influence over agency design.248 Rather than
243
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responding to the institution matching canon by deepening agencies’
expertise and expanding their formal mandates, Congress and the White
House could respond with circumvention and evasion. Institution matching,
as a result, might accelerate the aforementioned trends toward presidential
administration and “unitary” executive structure by creating an incentive for
presidents to substitute their own unilateral action for that of agencies.249 Or
formal agency mandates could be crafted with an eye to their use in
litigation rather than as accurate reflections of the actual operation of
bureaucracies. A collateral cost of this strategy would sound in democratic
accountability, which would diminish as publically available signals about
agency competencies and responsibilities peeled away from their de facto
operation. Further, and even absent congressional action, presidents could
frustrate the canon’s goals by expanding direct control over agencies
through appointments, direct instructions, or informal directives.250
The Executive may also respond to the prospect of judicial switching
from a formalist approach to a functional analysis by seeking to constrain
the flow of exogenous information available to courts. For example, an
administration that viewed the results in Hamdan and Boumediene as major
defeats might forestall future setbacks by ratcheting up penalties on the
unauthorized disclosure of information that, while posing no risk to national
security, contradicts governmental claims to efficiency, expertise, or
competence.251 To be sure, such responses are predictable even in the
absence of judicial use of institution matching. But the canon exacerbates
the incentives to render opaque the processes of government from either
formal or informal scrutiny. As with the manipulation of formal agency
mandates, anticipatory responses to functionalist institution matching have
the collateral effect of raising the cost of public superintendence of
governmental behavior. In the aggregate, this range of potential responses,
both formal and informal, may suggest that the dynamic effects of
institution matching may render the canon ineffectual as a tool for
promoting constitutional values.
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The observed sample of institution matching in action does not, to be
sure, readily yield examples of these sorts of strategic response. Congress
did not respond to Hampton by giving the CSC authority over national
security matters. Nor did Gonzales v. Oregon provoke statutory
enlargement of the Attorney General’s power to include regulation of the
medical profession. This absence of overt manipulation may simply be a
function of how rare judicial use of institution matching has been until now.
Alternatively, it may be evidence that courts also anticipate the possibility
of strategic circumvention, and use the canon sparingly to mitigate that risk.
Even if the political branches respond strategically to judicial
institution matching, is the canon necessarily futile? If the invocation of
institution matching is parried by cosmetic changes in institutional design,
then one option for courts would be the “mixed” strategy of randomizing
between a range of responses to agency decisions that approach a
constitutional threshold.252 Judges would resort to institution matching
stochastically, for example by pivoting between indirect promotion of
constitutional norms and direct enforcement of norms. Alternatively, judges
could randomize between different modalities of indirect enforcement, such
as institution matching, the avoidance canon, and nondelegation rules. In
either case, the absence of a stable and predictable judicial response may
mitigate the risk of political branch circumvention by raising the costs of
such evasion.
This is not as far-fetched as it sounds. It may indeed describe the
current interaction of the courts and the political branches. Notwithstanding
the judicial distaste for randomization,253 the current judicial approach to
constitutional problems may indeed be described as a mixed strategy of
sorts. From one case to the next, courts move seemingly at random from
indirect application of the Constitution via canons to direct, unmediated
constitutional rules. Courts also move between different canons without
much rhyme or reason. In the almost four decades since Hampton, for
example, institution matching can be discerned in a seemingly arbitrary set
of unconnected cases. But the Court is no more consistent in how it uses
other doctrinal devices, such as the avoidance or nondelegation canons.254
At least at the level of the Supreme Court, this seemingly stochastic pattern
cannot wholly be explained by litigant behavior. The Court’s discretionary
252
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control of the certiorari docket means that the Justices have as much control
over the pool of adjudicated disputes as litigants. Casual observation thus
suggests that the Court is engaged in some randomization between the
Constitution and substantive canons on the one hand, and within the class of
different substantive canons on the other hand. Perhaps this approach can
be justified on the ground that the Court’s approach makes it difficult for
political actors to respond strategically to the application of constitutional
rules.
In summary, the dynamic analysis of institution matching in an
extended timeframe introduces new possibilities to the analysis. It is hard to
know ex ante whether persistent use of the canon would induce positive or
negative feedback effects. The path of judicial–political branch interactions
may depend on the quality of interbranch relations at the time the canon is
first deployed: do the political branches view the courts as partners in the
production of policy outcomes, relying on the bench when direct political
action would face insurmountable obstacles in the legislative process or
would impose intolerable costs for the dominant political coalition of the
moment?255 Or is the relationship between the bench and the elected
branches more adversarial, perhaps as a result of slippages over time
between changing preferences of the bench and those of the dominant
national political coalition? The point of departure for institution matching,
that is, may be dispositive of its trajectory.256 On this view, the absence of
overt precedential fruit from the seed planted by Justice Stevens in 1976
may be less a function of poor doctrinal design and more the effect of the
happenstance that the Court in the late 1970s remained at odds with thendominant political coalitions.
CONCLUSION
The institution matching canon has been a persistent, but
underappreciated, feature of American public law since at least the
Hampton decision in 1976. It tests the justifications for government
abrogation of a liberty or equality interest by asking whether the policy was
“adopted for an appropriate reason by an appropriate decision maker.”257
While Hampton yielded no immediate progeny in the U.S. Reports, this
Article has documented the persistence of institution matching’s basic logic
through to the present day: the judicial search for a fit between the policy
justifications invoked to curtail a liberty or equality interest and the
institutional competences of the relevant component within a branch tasked
with that decision. That logic can be discerned in recent criminal law,
255
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administrative law, and national security law contexts. Rather than a legal
Lohengrin, institution matching may be the most important substantive
canon that most scholars and commentators have never heard about. And
rather than a dead letter, Justice Stevens’s first opinions for the Supreme
Court should be recognized for their surprising and enduring generative
effects in public law.
This is not to say that the institution matching canon is an unalloyed
boon to the project of judicial enforcement of constitutional rights, or that
judges should rush now to embrace it. Whether the evaluative focus is
narrow and case-specific, or broad and encompassing of sequential political
action across time, it is clear that the institution matching canon has
distinctive pros and cons. Assessment of the institution matching canon, as
with many substantive canons, in part depends on the reader’s independent
and prior judgments about the appropriate degree of judicial enforcement of
constitutional rules (should we all be Thayerians?), assessments of current
judicial behavior (are the courts today replete with activists or pushovers?),
and the substantive scope of constitutional liberty and equality entitlements
(is there anything left to the right to die after Washington v. Glucksberg?258).
Moreover, a judgment on the institution matching canon will also turn on
empirical questions about the relative degree of agency slack within
agencies and courts. I expect no settlement of the stormy normative and
empirical controversies around these matters.
Without essaying the Sisyphean task of reaching such settlement, I
have aimed here at offering a more tentative conclusion: Institution
matching has been part of the judicial toolkit for some time now. Courts
employ it to implement constitutional norms against a background of
complex empirical uncertainty and strategic political action. There is little
evidence (yet) that it fosters unacceptably high agency costs by allowing
judges to make freewheeling policy judgments about executive action. For
those who endorse a judicial role in constitutional enforcement, therefore,
the canon has attractive qualities that render it a superior instrument to more
familiar canons and presumptions of statutory construction at least some of
the time. To that end, it is past time to restore Justice Stevens’s opinion in
Hampton to its proper place in the canon of pathmarking constitutional
interpretation decisions.
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